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06-25-2002 - Joint Workshop
OHE CITY OF EDOEWATER POST OFFICE BOX 100-EDGEWATER, FLORIDA 32132-0100 Mayor Donald A. Schmidt District 1 Councilman James P. Brown District 2 Councilman Dennis A. Vincenzi District 3 Councilwoman Harriet E. Rhodes District 4 Councilwoman Judith R. Lichter City Manager Kenneth R. Hooper City Attorney Scott A. Cookson City Clerk Susan J. Wadsworth Legal Assistant Robin L. Matusick Asst. to City Mgr. Elizabeth J. McBride June 14,2002 -PUBLIC NOTICE- The City Council of Edgewater will hold a joint workshop session with the City of Oak Hill at 6:30 p.m., Tuesday, June 25, 2002, in the Community Center, 102 N. Riverside Drive. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the following topics: 1. City Boundaries 2. Annexations 3. Miscellaneous issues Pursuant to Chapter 286, F.S., if an individual decides to appeal any decision made with respect to any matter considered at a meeting or hearing, that individual will need a record of the proceedings and will need to insure that a verbatim record of the proceedings is made. In accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, persons needing assistance to participate in any of these proceedings should contact City Clerk Susan Wadsworth, 386-424-2407, prior to the meeting. :ejrn F:\meelingnolices\joinlworkshop062502 CITY MANAGER'S OFFICE 104 NORTH RIVERSIDE DRIVE (386)424-2404 FAX-(386)424-2421 CITY OF EDGEWATER 386 424 2409 06/14 '02 15:17 NO.069 02/02 THE CITY OF EDGE WATER POST OI , FICE , BOX 100- EDGEWATER, .PLOR.1DA 32132 -0100 Mayor Donald A. Schmidt District 1 Councilman James P. Brown District 2 Councilman Dennis A, Vincenzi District 3 Councilwoman Harriet E. Rhodes District 4 Councilwoman Judith R. Lichter June 14, 2002 - PUBLIC NOTICE- City Manager Kenneth R. Hooper City Attorney Scott A. Cookson City Clerk Susan J Wadsworth Legal Assistant Robin L. Matusick Asst. to City Mgr. Elizabeth J. McBride The City Council of Edgewater will hold a joint workshop session with the City of Oak Hill at 6:30 p.m., Tuesday, June 25, 2002, in the Community Center, 102 N. Riverside Drive. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the following topics: I. City Boundaries 2. Annexations 3. Miscellaneous issues Pursuant to Chapter 286, 1 if an individual decides to appeal any decision made with respect to tiny nnatrcr considered at a meeting or hearing, that individual will need a record of the proceedings and will need to insure that a verbatim record of the proceedings is made. In accordance with the Antericans with Uisabditics Act, peryuns needing assistance to participate in any of these. proceedings shnuld rontact City Clerk Sissan Wadsworth, 386- 424 -2407, prior to the nt.eeting. cjtn CITY MANAGER'S OFFICE 104 NORTH RIVERSIDE DRIVE k-':\ mcnungnnriccs \jointworkslrop062502 (388)424 -24114 FAX- (386)424 -2421 statutes - >View Statutes: Online Sunshine Title XI Chapter 164 County Organization And Intergovernmental Governmental Relations Disputes CHAPTER 164 GOVERNMENTAL DISPUTES 164.101 Short title. 164.102 Purpose and intent. 164.1031 Definitions. 164.1041 Duty to negotiate. 164.1051 Scope. 164.1052 Initiation of conflict resolution procedure; duty to give notice. 164.1053 Conflict assessment phase. 164.1055 Joint public meeting. 164.1056 Final resolution. 164.1057 Execution of resolution of conflict. 164.1058 Penalty. 164.1061 Time extensions. 164.1065 Applicability of ch. 99 -279. Page 1 of 6 View Entire C 164.101 Short title. -- Sections 164.101- 164.1061 may be cited as the "Florida Governmental Conflict Resolution Act." History. - -s. 1, ch. 87 -346; s. 1, ch. 99 -279. 164.102 Purpose and intent. - -The purpose and intent of this act is to promote, protect, and improve the public health, safety, and welfare and to enhance intergovernmental coordination efforts by the creation of a governmental conflict resolution procedure that can provide an equitable, expeditious, effective, and inexpensive method for resolution of conflicts between and among local and regional governmental entities. It is the intent of the Legislature that conflicts between governmental entities be resolved to the greatest extent possible without litigation. http: / /www.leg.state. fl.us /statutes /index.cfm? App_ mode = Display _Statute &URL= Ch0164 /ch... 6/25/02 statutes - >View Statutes: Online Sunshine Page 2 of 6 History. - -s. 2, ch. 87 -346; s. 2, ch. 99 -279. 164.1031 Definitions. - -For purposes of this act: (1) "Local governmental entities" includes municipalities, counties, school boards, special districts, and other local entities within the jurisdiction of one county created by general or special law or local ordinance. (2) "Regional governmental entities" includes regional planning councils, metropolitan planning organizations, water supply authorities that include more than one county, local health councils, water management districts, and other regional entities that are authorized and created by general or special law that have duties or responsibilities extending beyond the jurisdiction of a single county. (3) "Governmental entity" includes local and regional governmental entities. (4) "Local government resolution" has the same meaning as provided in s. 166.041. (5) "Governing body" means the council, commission, or other board or body in which the general legislative powers of a local or regional governmental entity are vested. (6) "Designee" means a representative with full authority to negotiate on behalf of a governmental entity and to recommend settlement to the appropriate decisionmaking body or authority of the governmental entity. (7) "Noticed public meeting" means a public meeting in which notice is given at least 10 days prior to the meeting by publication in the newspaper of widest circulation in the jurisdictions of the primary conflicting governmental entities. Each primary conflicting governmental entity shall provide notice within its jurisdiction. (8) "Primary conflicting governmental entities" means the governmental entity initiating the conflict resolution process provided for in this act, together with the governmental entity or entities with whom the initiating governmental entity has a conflict. The term does not include other governmental entities which may have a role in approving or implementing a particular element or aspect of any settlement of the conflict, or which may receive notice or intervene in the conflict resolution process provided for in this act. (9) "Mediation" means a process whereby a neutral third person called a mediator acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a conflict between two or more parties. The role of the mediator includes, but is not limited to, assisting the parties in identifying issues and exploring settlement alternatives. History. - -s. 3, ch. 99 -279. 164.1041 Duty to negotiate. -- (1) If a governmental entity files suit against another governmental entity, court proceedings on the suit shall be abated, by order of the court, until the procedural options of this act have been exhausted. The governing body of a governmental entity initiating conflict resolution procedures pursuant to this act shall, by motion, request the court to issue an order abating the case pursuant to this section. All governmental entities are encouraged to use the procedures in this act to resolve conflicts that may occur at any time between governmental entities, but shall use these procedures before court proceedings, consistent with the provisions of this section. The provisions of this act do not apply to administrative proceedings pursuant to chapter 120 or any appeal from any administrative or trial court judgment or decision. Nothing in this act shall limit a governmental entity from initiating and prosecuting eminent domain, foreclosure, or other court proceedings where, as a function of the nature of the suit, other governmental entities are necessary parties, if there are no materially disputed issues with regard to such joinder. Nothing in http: / /www. leg. state.fl.us / statutes /index.cfm? App_ mode = Display _Statute &URL= Ch0164 /ch... 6/25/02 statutes - >View Statutes: Online Sunshine Page 3 of 6 this act shall limit a governmental entity from filing any counterclaim or cross -claim in any litigation in which it is a defendant. Nothing in this act is intended to abrogate other provisions of law which provide procedures for challenges to specific governmental actions, including, but not limited to, comprehensive plan amendments and tax assessment challenges. The provisions of this act shall not apply to conflicts between governmental entities if an alternative dispute resolution process, such as mediation or arbitration, is specifically required by general law or agreed to by contract, interlocal agreement, or other written instrument, or if the governmental entities have reached an impasse during an alternative dispute resolution process engaged in prior to the initiation of court action. Further, nothing in this act shall preclude a governmental entity from filing a suit without resort to the provisions of this act against any federal or other governmental entity not governed by state law. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to toll or waive jurisdictional time limits on specific pleadings or motions set forth in statute or court rules unless modified pursuant to s. 164.1061. (2) If a governmental entity, by a three - fourths vote of its governing body, finds that an immediate danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the public requires immediate action, or that significant legal rights will be compromised if a court proceeding does not take place before the provisions of this act are complied with, no notice or public meeting or other proceeding as provided by this act shall be required before such a court proceeding. If a water management district, by three - fourths vote of its governing body, finds that an immediate danger to the natural resources, water resources, and wildlife requires immediate declaratory relief, or that significant legal rights will be compromised if a court proceeding does not take place before the provisions of this act are complied with, no notice or public meeting or other proceeding as provided by this act shall be required before such a court proceeding. However, the court, upon motion, may review the justification for failure to comply with the provisions of this act and make a determination as to whether the provisions of this act should be complied with prior to action by the court. If the court determines that the provisions of this act should be complied with prior to court action and that following the provisions of this act will not result in the compromise of significant legal rights, the court shall abate the suit until the provisions of this act are complied with. History. - -s. 4, ch. 99 -279. 164.1051 Scope. - -It is not the intent of this act to limit the conflicts that may be considered under this act, except that any administrative proceeding pursuant to chapter 120 shall not be subject to this act. Pursuant to s. 164.1041, this act shall apply, at a minimum, to governmental conflicts arising from any of the following issues or processes, including, but not limited to: (1) Any issue relating to local comprehensive plans or plan amendments prepared pursuant to part II of chapter 163, including, but not limited to, conflicts involving levels of service for public facilities and natural resource protection. (2) Municipal annexation. (3) Service provision areas. (4) Allocation of resources, including water, land, or other natural resources. (5) Siting of hazardous waste facilities, land fills, garbage collection facilities, silt disposal sites, or any other locally unwanted land uses. (6) Governmental entity permitting processes. (7) Siting of elementary and secondary schools. History. - -s. 5, ch. 99 -279. 164.1052 Initiation of conflict resolution procedure; duty to give notice. -- http: / /www.leg. state.fl.us /statutes /index.cfm? App _mode = Display _Statute &URL= Ch0164 /ch... 6/25/02 statutes - >View Statutes: Online Sunshine Page 4 of 6 (1) The governing body of a governmental entity shall initiate the conflict resolution procedures provided by this act through passage of a resolution by its members. The resolution shall state that it is the intention of the governing body to initiate the conflict resolution procedures provided by this act prior to initiating court proceedings or prosecuting action on a previously filed court proceeding to resolve the conflict and shall specify the issues of conflict and the governmental entity or entities with which the governing body has a conflict. Within 5 days after the passage of the resolution, a letter and a certified copy of the resolution shall be provided to the chief administrator of the governmental entity or entities with which the governing body has a conflict by certified mail, return receipt requested. The letter shall state, at a minimum, the conflict, other governmental entities in conflict with the initiating governmental entity, the justification for initiating the conflict resolution process, the proposed date and location for the conflict assessment meeting to be held pursuant to s. 164.1053, and suggestions regarding the officials who should be present at the conflict assessment meeting. The initiating governmental entity also shall mail a copy of the letter and resolution to any state, regional, or local governmental entities which, in the determination of the initiating governmental entity, may have a role in approving or implementing a particular element or aspect of any settlement of the conflict or whose substantial interests may be affected by the resolution of the conflict, and any other governmental entity deemed appropriate by the initiating governmental entity. (2) Within 10 days after receiving a copy of a certified letter noticing the initiation of the conflict resolution procedure, other governmental entities receiving the notice may elect to participate in the conflict resolution process, but are not entitled by virtue of that participation to control the timing or progress of the conflict resolution process, which at all times shall remain in the discretion of the primary conflicting governmental entities. However, a governmental entity which receives notice of a conflict may, by passage of its own resolution and by otherwise following the procedures set forth in subsection (1), join the conflict resolution process as a primary conflicting governmental entity. The intent of a governmental entity to join in the conflict resolution process shall be communicated to the initiating governmental entity by certified mail. The joining governmental entity also shall mail a copy of the letter to any state, regional, or local governmental entities which, in the determination of the joining governmental entity, may have a role in approving or implementing a particular element or aspect of any settlement of the conflict or whose substantial interests may be affected by the resolution of the conflict, and any other governmental entity deemed appropriate by the joining governmental entity. (3) For purposes of this act, the date of initiation of the conflict resolution procedure shall be the date of the passage of a resolution by a governmental entity. History. - -s. 6, ch. 99 -279. 164.1053 Conflict assessment phase. -- (1) After the initiation of the conflict resolution procedure, and after proper notice by certified letter has been given, a conflict assessment meeting shall occur. The meeting shall be scheduled to occur within 30 days of the receipt of the letter initiating the conflict resolution procedure. Public notice shall be given for this meeting in accordance with s. 164.1031(7). The conflict assessment meeting shall be scheduled to allow the attendance by the appropriate personnel from each primary conflicting governmental entity. The chief administrator, or his or her designee, for each governmental entity that is a primary conflicting governmental entity in the conflict resolution procedure shall be present at this meeting. If the entities in conflict agree, the assistance of a facilitator may be enlisted for the conflict assessment meeting. During the conflict assessment meeting, the governmental entities shall discuss the issues pertaining to the conflict and an assessment of the conflict from the perspective of each governmental entity involved. (2) If a tentative resolution to the conflict can be agreed upon by the representatives of the primary conflicting governmental entities at the conflict assessment meeting, the primary conflicting governmental entities may proceed with whatever steps they deem appropriate to fully resolve the conflict, including, but not limited to, the scheduling of additional meetings for informal negotiations or proposing a resolution to the governing bodies of the primary conflicting governmental entities. http: / /www.leg. state. fl.us/ statutes /index,cfm? App_ mode = Display _Statute &URL= Ch0164 /ch... 6/25/02 statutes - >View Statutes: Online Sunshine Page 5 of 6 (3) In the event that no tentative resolution can be agreed upon, the primary conflicting governmental entities shall schedule a joint public meeting as described in s. 164.1055, which meeting shall occur within 50 days of the receipt of the first letter initiating the conflict resolution process from the initiating governmental entity. (4) After the conclusion of the conflict assessment meeting, any primary conflicting governmental entity may request mediation as provided in s. 164.1055(2). History. - -s. 7, ch. 99 -279. 164.1055 Joint public meeting. -- (1) Failure to resolve a conflict after following authorized procedures as specified in s. 164.1053 shall require the scheduling of a joint public meeting between the primary conflicting governmental entities. The governmental entity first initiating the conflict resolution process shall have the responsibility to schedule the joint public meeting and arrange a location. If the entities in conflict agree, the assistance of a facilitator may be enlisted to assist them in conducting the meeting. In this meeting, the governing bodies of the primary conflicting governmental entities shall: (a) Consider the statement of issues prepared in the conflict assessment phase. (b) Seek an agreement. (c) Schedule additional meetings of the entities in conflict, or of their designees, to continue to seek resolution of the conflict. (2) If no agreement is reached, the primary conflicting governmental entities shall participate in mediation, the costs of which shall be equally divided between the primary conflicting governmental entities. The primary conflicting governmental entities shall endeavor in good faith to select a mutually acceptable mediator. If the primary conflicting governmental entities are unable to mutually agree on a mediator within 14 days after the joint public meeting, the primary conflicting governmental entities shall arrange for a mediator to be selected or recommended by an independent conflict resolution organization, such as the Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium, and shall agree to accept the recommendation of that independent organization, or shall agree upon an alternate method for selection of a mediator, within 7 business days after the close of that 14 -day period. Upon the selection of a mediator, the conflicting governmental entities shall schedule mediation to occur within 14 days, and shall issue a written agreement on the issues in conflict within 10 days of the conclusion of the mediation proceeding. The written agreement shall not be admissible in any court proceeding concerning the conflict, except for proceedings to award attorney's fees under s. 164.1058, where the agreement may be used to demonstrate an entity's refusal to participate in the process in good faith. History. - -s. 8, ch. 99 -279. 164.1056 Final resolution. - -If there is failure to resolve a conflict between governmental entities through the procedures provided by ss. 164.1053 and 164.1055, the entities participating in the dispute resolution process may avail themselves of any otherwise available legal rights. History. - -s. 9, ch. 99 -279. 164.1057 Execution of resolution of conflict. -- Resolution of a conflict at any phase shall require passage of an ordinance, resolution, or interlocal agreement that reflects the terms or conditions of the resolution to the conflict. History. - -s. 10, ch. 99 -279. 164.1058 Penalty. - -If a primary conflicting governmental entity which has received notice of http: / /www. leg. state.fl.us /statuteslindex.cfm? App_ mode = Display _Statute &URL= Ch0164 /ch... 6/25/02 statutes - >View Statutes: Online Sunshine Page 6 of 6 intent to initiate the conflict resolution procedure pursuant to this act fails to participate in good faith in the conflict assessment meeting, mediation, or other remedies provided for in this act, and the initiating governmental entity files suit and is the prevailing party in such suit, the primary disputing governmental entity which failed to participate in good faith shall be required to pay the attorney's fees and costs in that proceeding of the governmental entity which initiated the conflict resolution procedure. History. - -s. 4, ch. 87 -346; s. 11, ch. 99 -279. Note. -- Former s. 164.104. 164.1061 Time extensions. - -Any of the time requirements set forth in this act may be extended to a date certain by mutual agreement, in writing, of the primary conflicting governmental entities. To the extent such agreement would cause any jurisdictional time requirements to run with regard to a particular claim, the agreement shall have the effect of extending any jurisdictional time requirements with regard to that claim for the period set forth in the agreement. History. - -s. 12, ch. 99 -279. 164.1065 Applicability of ch. 99 -279.- -This act shall take effect upon becoming a law, but shall not be' construed to abrogate any otherwise applicable agreements or requirements of any contracts, interlocal agreements, or other written instruments which are in existence as of the effective date of this act. To the extent that any contractual or other agreement provisions in existence on the effective date of this act conflict with the provisions of this act, the provisions in the written agreement shall control. History. - -s. 14, ch. 99 -279. W • Session • Committees • Legi slators • Information Center •Statutes_ and Constitution • Lobbylst_.I..nformat on Disclaimer: The information on this system is unverified. The journals or printed bills of the respective chambers should be consulted for official purposes. Copyright ©2000 -2002 State of Florida. Contact us . Privacy Statement http: / /www.leg. state.fl.us /statutes /index.cfm? App _mode = Display _Statute &URL =ChO 164 /ch... 6/25/02 statutes - >View Statutes- >2001- >Ch0112- >Section 313: Online Sunshine Page 1 of 6 View Statutes Search Statutes Constitution Laws of Florida Order Select Year: 2 0013 7 The 2001 Florida Statutes Title X Chapter 112 View Entire Public Officers, Employees, And Public Officers And Employees: General ChaQte_ r Records Provisions 112.313 Standards of conduct for public officers, employees of agencies, and local government attorneys. -- (1) DEFINITION. - -As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, the term "public officer" includes any person elected or appointed to hold office in any agency, including any person serving on an advisory body. (2) SOLICITATION OR ACCEPTANCE OF GIFTS. - -No public officer, employee of an agency, local government attorney, or candidate for nomination or election shall solicit or accept anything of value to the recipient, including a gift, loan, reward, promise of future employment, favor, or service, based upon any understanding that the vote, official action, or judgment of the public officer, employee, local government attorney, or candidate would be influenced thereby. (3) DOING BUSINESS WITH ONE'S AGENCY. - -No employee of an agency acting in his or her official capacity as a purchasing agent, or public officer acting in his or her official capacity, shall either directly or indirectly purchase, rent, or lease any realty, goods, or services for his or her own agency from any business entity of which the officer or employee or the officer's or employee's spouse or child is an officer, partner, director, or proprietor or in which such officer or employee or the officer's or employee's spouse or child, or any combination of them, has a material interest. Nor shall a public officer or employee, acting in a private capacity, rent, lease, or sell any realty, goods, or services to the officer's or employee's own agency, if he or she is a state officer or employee, or to any political subdivision or any agency thereof, if he or she is serving as an officer or employee of that political subdivision. The foregoing shall not apply to district offices maintained by legislators when such offices are located in the legislator's place of business or when such offices are on property wholly or partially owned by the legislator. This subsection shall not affect or be construed to prohibit contracts entered into prior to: (a) October 1, 1975. (b) Qualification for elective office. (c) Appointment to public office. (d) Beginning public employment. (4) UNAUTHORIZED COMPENSATION. - -No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney or his or her spouse or minor child shall, at any time, accept any compensation, payment, or thing of value when such public officer, employee, or local government attorney knows, or, with the exercise of reasonable care, should know, that it was given to influence a vote or other action in which the officer, employee, or local government attorney was expected to participate in his or her official capacity. (5) SALARY AND EXPENSES. - -No public officer shall be prohibited from voting on a matter affecting his or her salary, expenses, or other compensation as a public officer, as provided by http: / /www.leg. state. fl.us/ statutes / index .cfm ?App_mode = Display _Statute& S earch_String = &... 6/25/02 statutes - >View Statutes- >2001- >Ch0112 -> Section 313: Online Sunshine Page 2 of 6 law. No local government attorney shall be prevented from considering any matter affecting his or her salary, expenses, or other compensation as the local government attorney, as provided by law. (6) MISUSE OF PUBLIC POSITION. - -No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney shall corruptly use or attempt to use his or her official position or any property or resource which may be within his or her trust, or perform his or her official duties, to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, herself, or others. This section shall not be construed to conflict with s. 104.3 (7) CONFLICTING EMPLOYMENT OR CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP.-- (a) No public officer or employee of an agency shall have or hold any employment or contractual relationship with any business entity or any agency which is subject to the regulation of, or is doing business with, an agency of which he or she is an officer or employee, excluding those organizations and their officers who, when acting in their official capacity, enter into or negotiate a collective bargaining contract with the state or any municipality, county, or other political subdivision of the state; nor shall an officer or employee of an agency have or hold any employment or contractual relationship that will create a continuing or frequently recurring conflict between his or her private interests and the performance of his or her public duties or that would impede the full and faithful discharge of his or her public duties. 1. When the agency referred to is that certain kind of special tax district created by general or special law and is limited specifically to constructing, maintaining, managing, and financing improvements in the land area over which the agency has jurisdiction, or when the agency has been organized pursuant to chapter 298, then employment with, or entering into a contractual relationship with, such business entity by a public officer or employee of such agency shall not be prohibited by this subsection or be deemed a conflict per se. However, conduct by such officer or employee that is prohibited by, or otherwise frustrates the intent of, this section shall be deemed a conflict of interest in violation of the standards of conduct set forth by this section. 2. When the agency referred to is a legislative body and the regulatory power over the business entity resides in another agency, or when the regulatory power which the legislative body exercises over the business entity or agency is strictly through the enactment of laws or ordinances, then employment or a contractual relationship with such business entity by a public officer or employee of a legislative body shall not be prohibited by this subsection or be deemed a conflict. (b) This subsection shall not prohibit a public officer or employee from practicing in a particular profession or occupation when such practice by persons holding such public office or employment is required or permitted by law or ordinance. (8) DISCLOSURE OR USE OF CERTAIN INFORMATION. - -No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney shall disclose or use information not available to members of the general public and gained by reason of his or her official position for his or her personal gain or benefit or for the personal gain or benefit of any other person or business entity. (9) POSTEMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS; STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR LEGISLATORS AND LEGISLATIVE EMPLOYEES. -- (a)1. It is the intent of the Legislature to implement by statute the provisions of s. 8(e), Art. II of the State Constitution relating to legislators, statewide elected officers, appointed state officers, and designated public employees. 2. As used in this paragraph: a. "Employee" means: http: / /www.leg. state. fl.us /statute s/ index .cfm ?App_mode = Display _Statute& Search_String = &... 6/25/02 statutes - >View Statutes- >2001- >Ch0112- >Section 313: Online Sunshine Page 3 of 6 (I) Any person employed in the executive or legislative branch of government holding a position in the Senior Management Service as defined in s. 110 or any person holding a position in the Selected Exempt Service as defined in s. 11.0._602 or any person having authority over policy or procurement employed by the Department of the Lottery. (II) The Auditor General, the director of the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, the Sergeant at Arms and Secretary of the Senate, and the Sergeant at Arms and Clerk of the House of Representatives. (III) The executive director of the Legislative Committee on Intergovernmental Relations and the executive director and deputy executive director of the Commission on Ethics. (IV) An executive director, staff director, or deputy staff director of each joint committee, standing committee, or select committee of the Legislature; an executive director, staff director, executive assistant, analyst, or attorney of the Office of the President of the Senate, the Office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Senate Majority Party Office, Senate Minority Party Office, House Majority Party Office, or House Minority Party Office; or any person, hired on a contractual basis, having the power normally conferred upon such persons, by whatever title. (V) The Chancellor and Vice Chancellors of the State University System; the general counsel to the Board of Regents; and the president, vice presidents, and deans of each state university. (VI) Any person having the power normally conferred upon the positions referenced in this sub - subparagraph. b. "Appointed state officer" means any member of an appointive board, commission, committee, council, or authority of the executive or legislative branch of state government whose powers, jurisdiction, and authority are not solely advisory and include the final determination or adjudication of any personal or property rights, duties, or obligations, other than those relative to its internal operations. c. "State agency" means an entity of the legislative, executive, or judicial branch of state government over which the Legislature exercises plenary budgetary and statutory control 3. No member of the Legislature, appointed state officer, or statewide elected officer shall personally represent another person or entity for compensation before the government body or agency of which the individual was an officer or member for a period of 2 years following vacation of office. No member of the Legislature shall personally represent another person or entity for compensation during his or her term of office before any state agency other than judicial tribunals or in settlement negotiations after the filing of a lawsuit. 4. No agency employee shall personally represent another person or entity for compensation before the agency with which he or she was employed for a period of 2 years following vacation of position, unless employed by another agency of state government. 5. Any person violating this paragraph shall be subject to the penalties provided in s. 1.12...3.17 and a civil penalty of an amount equal to the compensation which the person receives for the prohibited conduct. 6. This paragraph is not applicable to: a. A person employed by the Legislature or other agency prior to July 1, 1989; b. A person who was employed by the Legislature or other agency on July 1, 1989, whether or not the person was a defined employee on July 1, 1989; c. A person who was a defined employee of the State University System or the Public Service Commission who held such employment on December 31, 1994; http: / /www.leg. state.fl.us /statutes /index.cfm? App_ mode = Display _Statute &Search_String = &... 6/25/02 statutes - >View Statutes- >2001- >Ch0112- >Section 313: Online Sunshine Page 4 of 6 d. A person who has reached normal retirement age as defined in s. 121.021 and who has retired under the provisions of chapter 121 by July 1, 1991; or e. Any appointed state officer whose term of office began before January 1, 1995, unless reappointed to that office on or after January 1, 1995. (b) In addition to the provisions of this part which are applicable to legislators and legislative employees by virtue of their being public officers or employees, the conduct of members of the Legislature and legislative employees shall be governed by the ethical standards provided in the respective rules of the Senate or House of Representatives which are not in conflict herewith. (10) EMPLOYEES HOLDING OFFICE. -- (a) No employee of a state agency or of a county, municipality, special taxing district, or other political subdivision of the state shall hold office as a member of the governing board, council, commission, or authority, by whatever name known, which is his or her employer while, at the same time, continuing as an employee of such employer. (b) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any person holding office in violation of such provisions on the effective date of this act. However, such a person shall surrender his or her conflicting employment prior to seeking reelection or accepting reappointment to office. (11) PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING BOARD MEMBERS. - -No officer, director, or administrator of a Florida state, county, or regional professional or occupational organization or association, while holding such position, shall be eligible to serve as a member of a state examining or licensing board for the profession or occupation. (12) EXEMPTION. - -The requirements of subsections (3) and (7) as they pertain to persons serving on advisory boards may be waived in a particular instance by the body which appointed the person to the advisory board, upon a full disclosure of the transaction or relationship to the appointing body prior to the waiver and an affirmative vote in favor of waiver by two - thirds vote of that body. In instances in which appointment to the advisory board is made by an individual, waiver may be effected, after public hearing, by a determination by the appointing person and full disclosure of the transaction or relationship by the appointee to the appointing person. In addition, no person shall be held in violation of subsection (3) or subsection (7) if: (a) Within a city or county the business is transacted under a rotation system whereby the business transactions are rotated among all qualified suppliers of the goods or services within the city or county. (b) The business is awarded under a system of sealed, competitive bidding to the lowest or best bidder and: 1. The official or the official's spouse or child has in no way participated in the determination of the bid specifications or the determination of the lowest or best bidder; 2. The official or the official's spouse or child has in no way used or attempted to use the official's influence to persuade the agency or any personnel thereof to enter such a contract other than by the mere submission of the bid; and 3. The official, prior to or at the time of the submission of the bid, has filed a statement with the Department of State, if the official is a state officer or employee, or with the supervisor of elections of the county in which the agency has its principal office, if the official is an officer or employee of a political subdivision, disclosing the official's interest, or the interest of the official's spouse or child, and the nature of the intended business. (c) The purchase or sale is for legal advertising in a newspaper, for any utilities service, or for passage on a common carrier. http: / /www.leg. state.fl.us/ statutes /index.cfm? App_ mode = Display _Statute &Search_String = &... 6/25/02 statutes - >View Statutes- >2001- >Ch0112- >Section 313: Online Sunshine Page 5 of 6 (d) An emergency purchase or contract which would otherwise violate a provision of subsection (3) or subsection (7) must be made in order to protect the health, safety, or welfare of the citizens of the state or any political subdivision thereof. (e) The business entity involved is the only source of supply within the political subdivision of the officer or employee and there is full disclosure by the officer or employee of his or her interest in the business entity to the governing body of the political subdivision prior to the purchase, rental, sale, leasing, or other business being transacted. (f) The total amount of the transactions in the aggregate between the business entity and the agency does not exceed $500 per calendar year. (g) The fact that a county or municipal officer or member of a public board or body, including a district school officer or an officer of any district within a county, is a stockholder, officer, or director of a bank will not bar such bank from qualifying as a depository of funds coming under the jurisdiction of any such public board or body, provided it appears in the records of the agency that the governing body of the agency has determined that such officer or member of a public board or body has not favored such bank over other qualified banks. (h) The transaction is made pursuant to s. 240..2.29 or s. 2..4...0..241., and is specifically approved by the president and the Chancellor. The Chancellor shall submit to the Governor and the Legislature by March 1 of each year a report of the transactions approved pursuant to this paragraph during the preceding year. (i) The public officer or employee purchases in a private capacity goods or services, at a price and upon terms available to similarly situated members of the general public, from a business entity which is doing business with his or her agency. (j) The public officer or employee in a private capacity purchases goods or services from a business entity which is subject to the regulation of his or her agency and: 1. The price and terms of the transaction are available to similarly situated members of the general public; and 2. The officer or employee makes full disclosure of the relationship to the agency head or governing body prior to the transaction. (13) COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND SPECIAL DISTRICT AND SCHOOL DISTRICT RESOLUTIONS REGULATING FORMER OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES. - -The governing body of any county or municipality may adopt an ordinance and the governing body of any special district or school district may adopt a resolution providing that an appointed county, municipal, special district, or school district officer or a county, municipal, special district, or school district employee may not personally represent another person or entity for compensation before the government body or agency of which the individual was an officer or employee for a period of 2 years following vacation of office or termination of employment, except for the purposes of collective bargaining. Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit such ordinance or resolution. (14) LOBBYING BY FORMER LOCAL OFFICERS; PROHIBITION. - -A person who has been elected to any county, municipal, special district, or school district office may not personally represent another person or entity for compensation before the governing body of which the person was an officer for a period of 2 years after vacating that office. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to elected officers holding office as of October 1, 1992, until after their next election, and shall not apply to elected officers of school districts holding office on January 1, 1995, until after their next election. (15) ADDITIONAL EXEMPTION. - -No elected public officer shall be held in violation of subsection (7) if the officer maintains an employment relationship with an entity which is currently a tax - exempt organization under s. 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code and which contracts with or otherwise enters into a business relationship with the officer's agency and: http: / /www.leg. state. fl.us /statutes /index. cfm? App_ mode = Display _Statute &Search_String = &... 6/25/02 statutes - >View Statutes- >2001- >Ch0112- >Section 313: Online Sunshine Page 6 of 6 (a) The officer's employment is not directly or indirectly compensated as a result of such contract or business relationship; (b) The officer has in no way participated in the agency's decision to contract or to enter into the business relationship with his or her employer, whether by participating in discussion at the meeting, by communicating with officers or employees of the agency, or otherwise; and (c) The officer abstains from voting on any matter which may come before the agency involving the officer's employer, publicly states to the assembly the nature of the officer's interest in the matter from which he or she is abstaining, and files a written memorandum as provided in s. 112.3143 (16) LOCAL GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS. -- (a) For the purposes of this section, "local government attorney" means any individual who routinely serves as the attorney for a unit of local government. The term shall not include any person who renders legal services to a unit of local government pursuant to contract limited to a specific issue or subject, to specific litigation, or to a specific administrative proceeding. For the purposes of this section, "unit of local government" includes, but is not limited to, municipalities, counties, and special districts. (b) It shall not constitute a violation of subsection (3) or subsection (7) for a unit of local government to contract with a law firm, operating as either a partnership or a professional association, or in any combination thereof, or with a local government attorney who is a member of or is otherwise associated with the law firm, to provide any or all legal services to the unit of local government, so long as the local government attorney is not a full -time employee or member of the governing body of the unit of local government. However, the standards of conduct as provided in subsections (2), (4), (5), (6), and (8) shall apply to any person who serves as a local government attorney. (c) No local government attorney or law firm in which the local government attorney is a member, partner, or employee shall represent a private individual or entity before the unit of local government to which the local government attorney provides legal services. A local government attorney whose contract with the unit of local government does not include provisions that authorize or mandate the use of the law firm of the local government attorney to complete legal services for the unit of local government shall not recommend or otherwise refer legal work to that attorney's law firm to be completed for the unit of local government. History. - -s. 3, ch. 67 -469; s. 2, ch. 69 -335; ss. 10, 35, ch. 69 -106; s. 3, ch. 74 -177; ss. 4, 11, ch. 75 -208; s. 1, ch. 77 -174; s. 1, ch. 77 -349; s. 4, ch. 82 -98; s. 2, ch. 83 -26; s. 6, ch. 83 -282; s. 14, ch. 85 -80; s. 12, ch. 86 -145; s. 1, ch. 88 -358; s. 1, ch. 88 -408; s. 3, ch. 90 -502; s. 3, ch. 91 -85; s. 4, ch. 91 -292; s. 1, ch. 92 -35; s. 1, ch. 94 -277; s. 1406, ch. 95 -147; s. 3, ch. 96 -311; s. 34, ch. 96 -318; s. 41, ch. 99 -2; s. 29, ch. 2001 -266. Welcome • Session • Committees • Legislators • Information Center • Statutes and Constitution • Lobbyist Information Disclaimer: The information on this system is unverified. The journals or printed bills of the respective chambers should be consulted for official purposes. Copyright ©2000 -2002 State of Florida. Contact us . priyacy_Statemen..t http: / /www.leg.state.fl.us /statutes /index. cfm ?App_mode= Display _Statute& Search_String = &... 6/25/02 200 MUIVIGIYAL AIVIVtAA 1 1U UM l.V1V I MAIL., 11UN �+��• � � F.S. Ily the same I vices are pry or to annexat existing Muni 'ea to be ann provided, p rol I be able to se ording to the r extending v subdivisions. water mains axed is neces nstruction of the effective rich the municipj:' 1. 'ices into the area 'lnexation proce- ming body of the - eport required by commissioners of S located. .78-19; s. 13, ch. 81 -16Z; be annexed. --A ose to annex an ldards of subset:- subsection (2) or must be contigu- > at the time the reasonably com- icluded within the rnicipality. tnnexed must be ea developed rea which meets aion equal to at d included within lion equal to at d included within ots and tracts so amber of lots and 60 percent of the -- rea at the time of es, and it is sulr ast 60 percent of 1 eage used at the urban purposes, j ess in size. — ) ad for urban par' ay include in the yes not meet the area either: oundary and an so that the area r not adjacent to served by the 3es or water or (b) Is adjacent, on at least 60 percent of its external bo undary, to any combination of the municipal bound ,, the boundary of an area or areas developed for arban purposes as defined in subsection (2). The purpose of this subsection is to permit municipal go verning bodies to extend corporate limits to include a ll nearby areas developed for urban purposes and, W here necessary, to include areas which at the time of an nexation are not yet developed for urban purposes whose future probable use is urban and which consti- tute necessary land connections between the munici- pality and areas developed for urban purposes or between two or more areas developed for urban pur- poses. History. — s. 1, ch. 74.190; s. 2, ch. 76176. 171.044 Voluntary annexation. — (1) The o wner or o wner s of real roe in an unin- _Corporated area of a county which is contiguous to a municipality and reas onably tom ma t to rima Q the governing body of said municipality that said property be annexed to the municipality. (2) Upon determination by the governing body of the municipality t tLat the petition bears the siqnatures of all owners of or QperSy , in the area propo to be annexed, the governing body may, at any regular meet- ing, asopt a nonemergency ordinance to annex said property and redefine the boundary lines of the munici- pality to include said property. Said ordinance shall be passed after notice of the annexation has been pub- lished at least once each week for 2 consecutive weeks in some newspaper in such city or town or, if no news- paper is published in said city or town, then in a news- paper published in the same county; and if no newspa- per is published in said county, then at least three printed copies of said notice shall be posted for 4 con- secutive weeks at some conspicuous place in said city or town. The notice shall give the ordinance number and a brief, general description of the area proposed to be annexed. The description shall include a map clearly showing the area and a statement that the complete legal description by metes and bounds and the ordi- nance can be obtained from the office of the city clerk. (3) An ordinance adopted under this section shall be filed with the clerk of the circuit court and the chief administrative officer of the county in which the munici- pality is located and with the Department of State within 7 days after the adoption of such ordinance. The ordi- nance must include a map which clearly shows the annexed area and a complete legal description of that area by metes and bounds. (4) The method of annexation provided by this sec- tion shall be supplemental to any other procedure pro- vided by general or special law, except that this section shall not apply to municipalities in counties with char- ters which provide for an exclusive method of municipal annexation. (5) Land shall not be annexed through voluntary annexation when s nn resu s 1 e cre- a ro o enc a . ____._ (6) Upon publishing or posting the ordinance notice required under subsection (2), the governing body of the municipality must provide a copy of the notice, via certified mail, to the board of the county commissioners of the county wherein the municipality is located. The notice provision provided in this subsection shall not be the basis of any cause of action challenging the annex- ation. History. --s.1, ch. 74 -190; ss. 4, 5, ch. 75 -297; s. 3, ch. 76176; s. 2, ch. 86.113; s. 1, ch. 90.171; s. 16, ch. 90 -279; s. 16, ch. 98 -176. 171.045 Annexation limited to a single county. —In order for an annexation proceeding to be valid for the purposes of this chapter, the annexation must take place within the boundaries of a single county. History. —s. 2, ch. 74 -190. 171.046 Annexation of enclaves. — (1) The Legislature recognizes that enclaves can create significant problems in planning, growth man- agement, and service delivery, and therefore declares that it is the policy of the state to eliminate enclaves. (2) In order to expedite the annexation of enclaves of 10 acres or less into the most appropriate incorpo- rated jurisdiction, based upon existing or proposed ser- vice provision arrangements, a municipality may: (a) Annex an enclave by interlocal agreement with the county having jurisdiction of the enclave; or (b) Annex an enclave with fewer than 25 registered voters by municipal ordinance when the annexation is approved in a referendum by at least 60 percent of the registered voters who reside in the enclave. (3) This section does not apply to undeveloped or unimproved real property. History. —s. 18, ch. 93 -206. 171.051 Contraction procedures. —Any municipal- ity may initiate the contraction of municipal boundaries in the following manner: (1) The governing body shall by ordinance propose the contraction of municipal boundaries, as described in the ordinance, and provide an effective date for the contraction. (2) A petition of 15 percent of the qualified voters in an area desiring to be excluded from the municipal boundaries, filed with the clerk of the municipal govern- ing body, may propose such an ordinance. The munici- pality to which such petition is directed shall immedi- ately undertake a study of the feasibility of such pro- posal and shall, within 6 months, either initiate proceed- ings under subsection (1) or reject the petition, specifi- cally stating the facts upon which the rejection is based. (3) After introduction, the contraction ordinance shall be noticed at least once per week for 2 consecu- tive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality, such notice to describe the area to be excluded. Such description shall include a statement of findings to show that the area to be excluded fails to meet the criteria of s. 171.043, set the time and place of the meeting at which the ordinance will be consid- ered, and advise that all parties affected may be heard. (4) If, at the meeting held for such purpose, a peti- tion is filed and signed by at least 15 percent of the qualified voters resident in the area proposed for con- traction requesting a referendum on the question, the governing body shall, upon verification, paid for by the veloped area; or Qnt by: 3212640010; 01/27/02 12:23PM;J 214 RESOLUTION 02 -05 A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY OF OAK HILL, FLORIDA, ESTABLISHING THE AREAS FOR FUTURE ANNEXATION GROWTH; EXTENDING THE CITY LIMITS SOUTH TO INCLUDE U.S. HIGHWAY 1 TO THE BREVARD COUNTY LINE; EXTENDING THE CITY LIMITS NORTH TO INCLUDE U.S. HIGHWAY 1 TO THE INTERSECTION WITH CLINTON CEMETERY ROAD; EXTENDING THE CITY LIMITS FAST TO THE INDIAN RIVER; EXTENDING THE CITY LIMITS WEST TO INCLUDE MAYTOWN ROAD TO A POINT '/ MILE WEST OF INTERSTATE 95; AUTHORIZING THE CITY CLERK AND CITY ATTORNEY TO NOTIFY D.O.T. OF THE CHANGES; PROVIDING FOR CONFLICTS; AND PROVIDING FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE WHEREAS, the City of Oak Hill has previously determined that it is in the best interest of the City of Oak Hill to provide for future growth by annexation into the City of Oak Hill of areas North, South, East and West of the existing City limits; and WHEREAS, the City had previously met with the City of Edgewater and reached an informal agreement that the northern boundary of Oak Hill and the southern boundary of Edgewater would be the intersection of U.S. Highway 1 and Clinton Cemetery Road; and WHEREAS, the City of Oak Hill is in the process of seeking voluntary annexation petitions and desires to set its future boundaries to facilitate an orderly growth and annexation process. NOW, THEREFORE, it is resolved by the City of Oak Hill, Florida, City Commission, as follows: SECTION 1 The City hereby determines that the area for future growth of the City of Oak Hill shall be bounded by the Brevard County line on the South; the Indian River on the East; Received Time Jan.21. 12:02PM t by: 3212640010; 01/27/02 12 :23PM;) $479; Page 3/4 the intersection of U.S. Highway 1 and Clinton Cemetery Road on the North; and a point on Maytown Road ' / 4 mile west of Interstate 95 on the West. SECTION 2 In order to facilitate said future growth by annexation, the City of Oak Hill hereby extends its boundary South to incorporate all of U.S. Highway 1 south to the Brevard County line. SECTION 3 In order to facilitate said future growth by annexation, the City of Oak Hill hereby extends its boundary North to incorporate all of U.S, Highway 1 north to the intersection with Clinton Cemetery Road. SECTION 4 In order to facilitate said future growth by annexation, the City of Oak Hill hereby extends its boundary East to the Atlantio Ocean. SECTION 5 In order to facilitate said future growth by annexation, the City of Oak Hill hereby extends its boundary West to incorporate all of Maytown Road to a point ' / 4 mile west of the intersection with Interstate 95. SECTION 6 The City Clerk and the City attorney are herby directed to notify the State of Florida D.O.T. and other appropriate agencies of the changes so that the City limit signs can be moved accordingly. SECTION 7 All prior resolutions or parts thereof in conflict herewith are hereby repealed. 2 Received Time Jan,27. 12:02PM .ent.by: 3212640010; SECTION 8 This resolution shall take effect upon adoption. 01/27/02 12:23PMIJ #479;Page 4/4 The above and foregoing resolution was moved for approval by Commissioner c;r Me S'�C (- and seconded by Commissioner and upon vote subscribed herein, the same was declared to be adopted at the Regular Meeting of the City Commission of Oak Hill, Florida held on January 16, 2001. A roll call vote resulted as follows: S' -o Robert Jackson, Mayor (4) U R,p Abraham Jackson/Commissioner (2) Darry L. Evans, Vice Mayor /Commissioner (1) r Susaii A. Cook, Commissioner (3) Ron Mercer, Commissioner (5) ATTEST ': � '/' � L,,,7 Z x - -, " CHERBANO, City Clerk 3 } 4 • .'' a _. ; 9 a q Y rt� Received Time Jan,27. 12:02PM CITY OF EDGEWATER 904 424 2409 02/19 '02 15:05 NO.794 02/06 © ORDINANCE NO. 2001 -0 -53 0 C4 AN ORDINANCE ANNEXING CERTAIN REAL, PROPERTY o O CONSISTING OF APPROXIMATE LY 3.18 MILES OF U. S. HiGHWAY #1 RiGIFF -OF -WAY FROM THE SOUTHERN CORP LIMITS OF THE CiTY OF EDGF.WATER '1'0 � tip off THE NORTHERN LiNE OF ARIEL ROAD VOL , IISIA 1 = s Q 3 FLORIDA INTO THE �' D L- Q a C:1TY OF LUGEWA'l'li✓R, & 0 10 FLORIDA; SUBJECT TO THE .IURISD.IC: "PION, OBLIGATIONS, BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE CiTY OF EDGEWATER; AMENDING THE DESCRiPTION OF THE CITY OF EDGEWATER CORPORATE. LIMITS; PROVIDING FOR FILING WITH THE CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT, VOLUSIA COUNTY, THE VOLUSIA COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE; PROVIDING FOR CONFLICTING PROVISIONS, SF,VERABILITY AND APPLICABILITY; PROVIDING FOR AN EFFECTiVE DATE AND FOR ADOPTION. WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Edgewater, Florida, has made the fallowing determinations: Florida Department of Transportation ( "FDOT ") is the owner of that certain right -of way known as U. S. Highway #1 between the southern corporate limits of the City of Edgewater to the northern line of Ariel Road, Volusia County, Florida, said Property containing approximately 3.1 ii miles and being described in Exhibit "A" and depicted in Exhibit "I3 ", both of which are attachcd hereto and by this reference incorp herein. 2. FDOT has submitted to the City of Edgewater a letter of no objection dated July 31, 2001 to the annexation ofsaid right -of -way. 3. Notice ol'the proposed annexation has been published pursuant to the rcyuiremews of Section 171.044(2),Florida Statutes. 5trurk- thrcmgh passages arc deleted. Und erlined passages are added. 2001.0 -S3 Received Time Feb-19, 2:57PM CITY OF EDGEWATER 904 424 2409 02/19 '02 15:05 NO.794 03/06 4. The property is contiguous to the City's boundaries and the conditions for annexation t N and the economies thereof are satisfactory. The property is within the "reserve area" as stipulated `O t ri pursuant to Ordinance 988- (:) -12 which was adopted by the City Council and authorized by C'haptcr 180, Florida Statutes. Q,l j b 5. The boundaries of voting District 4 of the City of Edgewater are hereby designated � ll. 10 include the property described herein NOW, THEREFOR.✓, BE IT ENACTFD by the People of the City of'F,dgewater, Florida: PAR A. ANNEXATION OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY INTO THE CiTY OF EDGEWATER, FLORIDA. l . Pursuant to Section 171.044, Florida Statutes, that certain real property described in 1 {xhibit "A" and depicted in the map identified as Exhibit "B ", is hereby annexed into and made pat? ol'the City of Edgewater, Florida, and shall be subject to the jurisdiction, obligations, benefits and privileges of the municipality. 2. The boundaries of the City orEdgewater are hereby redefined to include the property described in Exhibit "A" and depicted in the map identified as Exhibit "B". 3. Pursuant to Section 2.01 of the Charter of the City ol'Edgewater, Florida, that certain document entitled "Description of City of F,dgewatcr Corporate Limits" shall be amended accordingly. 4. Within seven (7) days after adoption, copies of this ordinance shall be filed with the Volusia County Clerk of the Circuit Court, the Volusia County Property Appraiser, the Volusia County Manager, [lie Mapping Division of the Volusia County Growth Management Department, Struck throng! passages ;ire dcicted. Lindc rlincd lmssages are added. 20111 -0 -53 2 Received Time Feb,19, 2:57PM CITY OF EDGEWATER 904 424 2409 02/19 1 02 15:05 NO.794 04/06 and the Department of'State. PART B. CONFLICTING PROVISIONS. All conflicting ordinances and resolutions, or pails thercul'in conflict with this ordinance. tare hereby SUPerseded by this ordinance to the extent of such conflict. PART C. SEVE1;ABILITY AND APPLICABILITY. 0� if any portion of this ordinance is for any reason held or declared to be unconstitutional inoperative, or void, such holding shall not affect the remaining portions of this ordinance. If this ordinance or any provisions thereof shall be held to be inapplicable to any person, property, or circumstances, such holding shall not affect its applicability to any other person, property, or circumstance. PAKT D. U'FECTIVE DATE. This urdinance shall take effect upon adoption. PART E. ADOPTION. After Motion by Councilman Brawn and Second by Councilman Vincenzi, the vote on the first reading /public hearing of this ordinance held on August 6, 2001, was as fellows: AVE NAY Mayor Donald A. Schmidt X Councilman James P. Brown X Councilman Dennis A. Vincenzi X Councilwoman Harriet. L. Rhodes X Councilwoman Judy l.ichter X After Motion by - � .�. and S'econd by St, m. k th, ough passages are deleted. t,l nderhtied passages are added. 2001 -0-53 3 Received Time Feb,19, 2:57PM - CITY OF EDGEWATER 904 424 2409 02/22 1 02 12:16 NO.879 01/01 the vote on the; second reading/public hearing of this ordinance held on zQ — ' 2001, was as follows: `Q IT H AYE. NAY pill Mayor Donald A. Schmidt 4 Councilman James P, Brown — Councilman Dennis A, Vincenzi _ Councilwoman Harriet E. Rhodes I Councilwoman Judy I,ichter_ PASSED AND DULY ADOPT ED this - 4&_ day of �..�- — 2001. ATTEST: �s= 'Susan J. WA&.worth "77 City Clerk •�� , For the use and reliance only by the City of Edgewater, Florida- Approved as to form and legality by; Scutt A. Cookson, Esquire City Attorney Foley & I.ardner -, - ask -thm i,# passages are deleted. Underlined passages are Gilded. 2001 -0 -53 4 CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF UDC EWATER, FLORIDA BY . Donald A. Schmidt Mayor Robin L. Matusick Legal Assistant Approved by the (:'ity Council of the (:'ily of l"Agew ter at a meeting held on this _a day of.,_, 2001 under Agenda Item No, Received Time Feb-22. 12:08PM �O sell 00 CITY OF EDGEWATER 904 424 2409 02/19 1 02 15:05 NO.794 05/06 EXHIBIT "A" LEC- AL DF,SCRiPTION All that variable width road right-of-wa owned, claimed or maintained by the Florida Department of Transportation for use as U.S. Hi.ghway No.l and /or Florida State Highway No.5, said rit,ht -n way being more particularly described as that right-of-way as may he shown or described on applicable Florida Department. ofTransportation right -Of -way maps which lies south ofthe southern city limit of the city of Ndgewater Florida, and north of Ariel Rd. north of the northern city limit of the city of Oak Hill Florida. The legal description includes any /all adjoining right -of -way relating to the subject property. • Struck thrtnrgh passages we Deleted Underl passages are added, 2001 -0 -53 5 Received Time Feb-19. 2:57PM NdLg:Z 61,qOJ OW11 POA1009d ORDINANCE 2M - a•u 00 (D I I k a r*TY OF EDGEWATER 904 424 2409 02/20 '02 14:01 N0,821 01/02 THE CITY OF ED G. WA TES POST OFFICE BOX 100-E[-)GE W,4 7E'R, FLORIDA 32132 -0100 Mayor Donald A. Schmidt Distrir..l 1 Councilman James P. Brown Districl 2 Councilman Dennis A, Vincenzi District 3 Councilwoman HfiMet E. Rhodes Dlsirict 4 Councilwoman Judith R. Lichter February 20, 2002 Mayor Robert Jackson City of oak Hi 11 234 South US 1 Oak Hill, FL 32759 Dear Mayer and City Commissioners: City Manager Kenneth R. Hooper City Attorney Scott A. Cookson City Clark Susan J. Wadsworth Legal Assistant Robin L. Matusick Assi, to City Mgr, Elizabeth J. Mc8ride Via Fax 345 -1834 and t)S Mail On February 11, 2002, the City of Edgewater Mayor and members of the City Council received your letter and Resolution 02 -05 (dated January 28, 2002) concerning the expansion of the City of Oak Hill boundaries. It remains the desire of the City of Edgewater to cooperatively work with the City of Oak Hill to the ,joint benefit of both municipalities. Notwithstanding, your letter and accompanying your Resolution generates several concerns: 1) The effect, or the intended effect, of the Resolution is unclear. A City may only change or expand its municipal boundaries by adoption of a properly advertised Ordinance providing for annexation, pursuant to Chapter 171, Florida Stal.utcs, 2) Your Resolution indicates that there is an "informal agreement" with Edgewater concerning the future north boundary.of Oak Hill to be located at Clinton Cemetery Road. No such formal or informal agreement exists concerning Clinton Cemetery Road being the boundary between the two Cities. 3) The area described in your Resolution north of Ariel Road to Clinton Cemetery Road is already within the municipal boundaries of the City of Edgewater. This area was properly annexed into the City of Edgewater by Ordinance Number 2001 -0 -53 adopted September 10, 2001. Furthermore, the area north of Ariel Road is contained in Edgewater's Chapter 180 5 -mile reserve area that was adapted by the City (Ordinance 88 -0-12) in 1988. Tile area is also included in the utility service area defined in an interlocal agreement between Volusia County and Edgewater dated October 3, 1994, and modified May 30, 1996 and September 1999. CITY MANAGER'S OFFICE 104 NORTH RIVERSIDE DRIVE P o r o i v o rl T i m o F o h. 9 0. I F d P MI-2404 FAX - (3861424 -2421 t;T`Y OF EDGEWATER 904 424 2409 02/20 '02 14:01 NO.821 02/02 Mayor Robert Jackson February 20, 2002 Page 2 A hrief history of this annexation indicates the City of Edgewater conducted a public hearing concerning the first reading of Ordinance 2001 -0 -53 on August 6, 2001, for the purpose of annexation of US 1 right -of -way south to Ariel Road. FDOT sent a letter indicating no objection to the annexation. Oak Hill Vice Mayor Jesse McClain attended that public heaving and requested the City of Edgewater conduct a joint work session with Oak Hill to discuss the proposed annexation of the US l right -of -way south to Ariel Road. A joint work session was conducted on August 20, 2001. Attendees from Oak Hill included: Mayor Susan Cook, Vice Mayor Jessie McClain, Commissioner Abraham Jackson Commissioner Robert Jackson and City Clerk Marilyn Stephens. Attendees from Edgewater included: Mayor Don Schmidt. Councilwoman Harriet Rhodes, Councilwoman Judy Lich ter, Councilman Jim Brown, Councilman Dennis Vincenzi, City Manager Ken Hooper and City Clerk Susan Wadsworth. Also in attendance were several people residing along US 1 from Edgewater to Oak Hill After discussion from elected officials from both Cities and from the public, the consensus watt that Edgewater would conduct its second public hearing on Ordinance 2001 -0 -53 to annex the US i right -of -way south to Ariel Road and without objection from Oak Hill. The City of Edgewater conducted its second advertised public hearing for Ordinance 2001.0 -53 on September 10, 2001. With no objections from Oak Hill or any other members of the. public, the Ordinance was adopted, The Mayor of Edgewater appeared before the VOlusia County Council (October 2001) for a discussion concerning the annexation of the TJS 1 right -of -way, future expansion plans of the City of Edgewater concern ing and the successful cooperation that has occurred between the County and Edgewater. The County Council voted to not appeal the annexation of US 1 right -of- way. After expiration of the appeal period, Edgewater relocated the City limit signage to the new City boundaries. If you would like to meet and discuss this or any other issues that may be beneficial to bath entities, please contact me at 424 - 2404. Sincerely, *nneth R. Hooper City Manager KR1I:ejm cc: Mayor and City Council County Council County Manager Cynthia A. Coto County A ttorney Daniel D, Eckert District Traffic Operation Engineer Fred Ferrell, P,E, CM 2002.23 F.Auurmsuondr-- ...I" _ , - I I I � , � , CITY of EDGEWATER 904 424 2409 WdLE l ''ZZ'ady pariiamdl02 ,o THE CITY OF EDGE WATER AOSTOFFICF_ BOX 100- E'DGEWATER, FLORIDA 32132 -0100 U Mayul l�ronld n. Sdtmitlt Di,lnet i Cuuneilm" Jymca P. llm+ n Ihs4iu 2 C nutxllruait Dcnnic A. V inev1O71 r? I(Izi I t:uumcilwomits I•tnt 1' Rh-ks 1)19tnd+ d Cot,ncilw Judy 1.401ter _'Iry mmvtgcr Kcnmte R Mrhoper City Clary Susdt 1. w2fdvw1111 City AitomV Scm A t uks.on LUP,k t AuIAV L }tn6in L. MMusick ASM w Ca. Munger F.1173hcth J Mcldridv July 30.2001 Frt:d W_ Loose, Esquire Florida f3epartment of rranspwadon District Office 719 S. Woodland Blvd. Deland, Fl., 32729 Faesirnile Tra"Snrission (384) 7361 -5046 Rc: City of Edgewater l" Right -of -Ways near. yir. Loose, PLInuant to our conversation on Friday, this will confirm that the City vrEdgewatcr is continuously growing and has annexed various properties south along U. S. Highway if and west along S luts Rvad 4442, Due t our con[inuous growth, the City i3 interested in annexing I'DOT right -of -ways along U. S. Highway #1 from the southern carporwc limits of the City to the northern line ofAriel Ruud and along the State Road #442 corridor. The City of Cdgctvater is requesting tint Florida Uepartmcnt of TransporlutiOn agree foT a voluntarily annexation of the right- oPways along U. S_ Highway #1 and the State Road -6442 corridor into the corpowc limits of the City. Plcasc lctus know if yo u will agree to the voluntary annexation and forward a letter (fl'no objection to the annexation process. Thank you in advance for your c[ouperation in this tneniter and do not hesitate to call L),ur office if you have any questions. Sincerely, Robin L. Matusick Legal AssistaTA rim : 'C'mL llb P.I RTMB1�7' (94INJ1,NO3 104 NoAry Jr/p'Gor1AR AJtJVIf I AX (QW)✓Zi<.-24JS pr 424.2409 SUVMM 383 -2103 ■ TH 0£T£4t£98£ XVA OV :6T NOR ZO /ZZ /VO 'CITY OF ED�EWATE° U E : l ZZ' a da 8W I J P8V 80@d 904 X24 2409 (3ci c� Oc i : �4 U4, 02 Fdorda Depares� �aSOs>rs are IF.R WISH 6VER OR 71 5. Woodland Blvd DeLond, FL 32720 -6834 Telephone: (386) 943 -5499 Facsimile_ (386) 736 -5046 E Mail_ Timothy LauhachaDOT. State. Fl_ US my 3 1, `W 1 1 ls_ Rohin A L. Matnsick Legatl Assistant ?'he pity' cif Lclgewater ;lost office Box lam' l�dgewaaate, , Fivri -d a ✓s x a.; vV Cni RE: i'DvT Right- of -;vay Dear Ms, M 3 t Usick: TH OMAS F. DARRY, Jii. SECRETARY J 3 ` 2081 CTY AT EY This Will confinin Both tV,,r. . i red Looses' and iily telephone co nversafion with you re ding . your correspondence dated July 30, 2001, While the Department of Trans Lion 011110t c01)5= to the annexing of the Departmcnts right -n; way along U.S. Highway 1 and Stare Road 442, we have no abjection to the aru9exat.iou process. If you have any further questions, please call me. ;'wry truly Timot v C_ L.aubach Senior Attorney w w dQ L. sate. t7 _ u ti ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ THE 0CUGVE99C XVd TV :bT NON ZO /ZZ /V0 ■ E City of Oak Hill 234 South U.S. Hwy. #I Oak Hill, Florida 32759 Phone 386 - 345 -3522 Fax: 386 - 345 -1834 June 24, 2002 Scott Cookson, Esq. Edgewater City Attorney 111 North Orange Avenue Suite 1800 Orlando, Florida 32801 Re: Attempted annexation of U.S. Hwy# 1 by City of Edgewater Dear Mr. Cookson: Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated June 20, 2002 from Timothy C. Laubach, Senior Attorney for the Florida Department of Transportation. This letter as well as the established law should clarify that Edgewater's recent actions in attempting to annex U.S. Hwy# 1 south to Ariel Road are not proper. Please have the appropriate officials from your fine City remove the recently placed city limits signs by placing them back where they were and should be by law. Thank you for your anticipated cooperation. i James W. Markel City Attorney of Oak Hill Florida Bar #098710 Florida Department ransportation JEB BUSH 719 S. Woodland Blvd THOMAS F. BARRY, JR. GOVERNOR SECRETARY Deland, FL 32720 -6834 (386) 943 -5499 Fax: (386) 736 -5046 Timothy. Laubach @DOT. State. FL. US June 20, 2002 J. W. Markel, Esquire City Attorney, City of Oak Hill 234 South U. S. Highway 1 Oak Hill, Florida 32759 RE: FDOT right of way Dear Jim: Pursuant to our recent telephone conversation and the correspondence you faxed to my attention, the DOT does not have the authority (by statute or rule) and cannot agree to an annexation of or transfer the U.S. 1, State Road 5, right of way. I hope this helps clarify the previous correspondence dated July 31, 2002. If you have any questions, please call me. Very truly yours, Timoth C. Laubach Senior Attorney www. dot. state. fl.us WdZ�AI ZZ °Idy aWIi pania00 Florida Department of Transportation JEB BUSH 719 South Woodland Boulevard GO VERNOR Deland, Florida 32720 -Sgpp February 25, 2002 Mr. Robert Jackson, Mayo, City of Oak Hill 234 South US 1 Oak Hill, Florida 32759 Re: Section 79010 - US 1 volusia County Dear Mayor Jackson: THOMAS E BARRY, JR SECRETAR; We have completed our review of your request to relocate the Oak Hill city limit Si gns, based anticipated annexation of land to both the north and south of the existing city boundaries. a on We are unable to approve the requested change at this time. Please provide the Department notification once the annexation is complete; we will then be able to perform the work with official FDF /aekla. cc: Ms. Lennon Moore Mr. Jerry Woods Mr. Chris Cairns Sincerely, .Fred D. Ferrell PE. District Tra i s :.,,t• -.. - Operations Engineer ^✓.dot.state.fi.us T00 in 0£T£9b£99C YVA ST :VT NOW ZO /ZZ /b0 City of Oak Hill 234 South U.S. Hwy. #1 Oak Hill, Florida 32759 Phone 386 - 345 -3522 Fax: 386 - 345 -1834 Robert A. Butterworth Florida Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 -1050 May 13, 2002 Dear Attorney General Butterworth: This letter is the formal request by the City of Oak Hill for the Attorney General to file a Quo Warranto action against the City of Edgewater. The City of Edgewater, Florida, Volusia County, has acted contrary to The Florida Constitution, contrary to Chapter 171, Florida Statutes, to numerous attorney general opinions including AGO 080 -100, a copy enclosed, and to case law in its attempt to annex U.S. Highway #I south from the legal boundary of Edgewater to Ariel Road. While the City of Oak Hill has several times in public meetings expressed and made clear that the actions and improper ordinance of the City of Edgewater is of no effect, the City of Edgewater has moved its city limits sign south to Ariel Road and through its appointed representative, the City Manager, stated that Oak Hill approved the ordinance or did not object to the ordinance or has sat on its rights and is, therefore, powerless to stop Edgewater's actions. More specifically, the City Manager has written that there is no agreement, formal or informal, reached by the two Cities as to the agreed upon boundary, a patently incorrect assertion. Please review this situation and thereafter institute a quo warranto action as set forth in and required by Florida Law, or otherwise take appropriate action to nullify the City of Edgewater's ill- conceived and improper attempts at annexation of U. S. #I south of its present boundary. Thank you for your prompt attention to this important matter. Yours in law, James W. Markel Oak Hill City Attorney, Florida Bar #098710 Copy: Frederic B. O'Neal, Esq., Special Counsel City of Oak Hill, Florida Bar #0252611 080 -100 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 080 -100— December 9, 1980 the sta. MUNICIPALITIES 171.041 This UNAUTHORIZED TO ANNEX STATE ROADS OR TO POLICE municil STATE ROADS NOT WITHIN CORPORATE LIMITS 171.041 To: John Roger Smith, Orange City City Attorney, DeLand annexal a statut Prepared by: Percy W Mallison, Jr., Assistant Attorney General QUESTIONS: the goy 1. May a municipality annex a federal highway /state road pursuant to the annexation procedures contained in s. 171.0413, F. S.? cor ab: ins 2. May a municipality exercise police jurisdiction over a federal highway /state road which is contiguous to but not within n the municipal 3 Suttee borders? Statute: SUMMARY: (Fla. 19 statutor A municipality may not annex a federal highway /state road pursuant county, to the provisions of and the annexation procedures p prescribed by 171.0413, F. S., and a municipality may not et seq et seq., railroad exercise police jurisdiction over a federal highway /state road contiguous to but not within the Fla., 19' corporate limits of the city. immuni Your letter indicates that your questions are prompted by the fact that for the past several years the City of Orange City has been annexing incorporated g property south of its original 1949) (1 corpora orpora limits along U.S. Highway 17 -92 (a federal and state highway) pursuant to the voluntary annexation procedure provided for in s. 171.044, F. S. That section allows intent t] a to the municipality, a municipality to annex property which is contiguous that the owner or owners of said ppro ert or its y, r escrip for of the properties do avid c, pu c conclu r conclude so annexed not include or therein (but exclude) de) the right- of -way of U.S. Highway 17.92. You state that U.S. Highway 17 -92, also desi Florida of Oran Department of Transportation as State Road No. 15, runs north sou h through the center of the original incorporated I No. 15, area and along or through and contiguous to the areas recently annexed, which appear from the map furnished to to be AS TO 1 me interspersed with unincorporated areas along each side of U.S. Highway 17 -92. Since title to all roads designated as state roads is vested in the state (see ss. 335.02, 337.27, Your and 337.29, F. S.) and since the state has never petitioned for the annexation of the aforementioned state road, it has never been over i mu annexed into the municipality the voluntary annexation procedure. The result is that this federal highway /state road i t o r i t his r e n now forms an unincorporated corridor extending outward from the original municipal limits with recently annexed municipal territory this reg. which interspersed with unincorporated property along each side of it. o g ener AS TO QUESTION 1: have or, Since voluntary annexation of the hi highway g y in question is precluded by the inability of the city to obtain an annexation petition from the ove roa to t state, you wish to know whether the City of Orange City can annex this federal highway /state road pursuant to the annexation procedures contained in s. 171.0413, F. S. For the following reasons, I must ow conclude that it cannot. nec nec reg. The annexation procedures outlined in s. 171.0413, F. S., require the governing body of a municipality to adopt a nonemergency ordinance U.S. f proposing the annexation of contiguous, compact, unincorporated territory. The ordinance does not become effective, however, until at least 10 days after it has been juruate regulate a pproved by a majority of the registered electors in both the municipality and the territory to be annexed. If a majority of the electors in either the municipality streets olice or the area to be annexed vote against annexation, the ordinance has no legal efficacy, and the area may not be the subject of p i, re another annexation attempt for at least 2 years. It is difficult to see how any such ordinance legally may be approved by indict - tchhct tch a majority of the registered electors of the area comprising to that 252 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 080 -100 the state -owned roadbed which the city wishes to annex under the provisions of s. 253 171.0413. This statutory provision, providing as it does for uniform statewide standards for municipal annexation (see s. 2(c), Art. VIII, State Const., and ss. 171.021(2), 171.022, and 171.0413(4), F. S.), nowhere expressly refers to or prescribes any procedures for the annexation of state -owned road rights -of -way. The general rule with respect to construing a statute as applying to the state and its agencies and subdivisions is as follows: Statutory provisions which are written in such general language as to make them reasonably susceptible to being construed as applicable alike both to the government and to private parties are subject to a presumptive rule of construction which exempts the government from their operation in the absence of other particular indicia supporting a contrary result in particular to instances. al 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction s. 62.01 (4th Ed. 1974). And see generally 82 C.J.S. al Statutes s. 317; Duval County v. Charleston Lumber & Manufacturing Co., 33 So. 531 (Fla. 1903) (county not subject to garnishment proceeding unless made so by express statutory provision); State v. Peninsular Telephone Co., 75 So. 201 (Fla. 1917) (a city or j county, being a governmental as well as a corporate entity, is in its governmental capacity not a "person or corporation" within the meaning and intent of former s. 364.01 nt et seq., providing for regulation of telegraph and telephone companies by the former S. railroad commission); State v. Gordon Brothers Concrete, Inc., 339 So.2d 156 (2 D.C.A. )n Fla., 1976) (garnishment statute did not provide statutory authority for waiver of state's se immunity in garnishment proceeding); City of St. Petersburg v. Carter, 39 So.2d 804 (Fla. 1949) (the term "corporation" in a statute does not ordinarily include municipal corporations, and the term "persons" in a statute does not ordinarily include municipal ie past corporations, unless they are expressly included by apt words or unless a clear legislative original intent that they be included is expressed in the context); and AGO's 074 -261 and 080 -68. ,iant to Consequently, in the circumstances hereinbefore set forth and in the absence of any clear allows evidence of legislative intent to permit a municipality to annex state -owned highways Bd that pursuant to s. 171.0413, or statutorily prescribed procedures therefor, I am compelled to iptions conclude that such state -owned lands are not subject to being annexed and that the City B right- of Orange City, therefore, is precluded from annexing U.S. Highway 17 -92 /State Road by the No. 15, pursuant to the annexation procedures contained in s. 171.0413. south :iguous AS TO QUESTION 2: to be ce title Your second question concerns whether a municipality may exercise police jurisdiction :7, and over a state road (and U.S. highway) which is contiguous to but not part of the of the municipality. Section 2(c), Art. VIII, State Const., provides that the "exercise of extra - aant to territorial powers by municipalities shall be as provided by general or special law." In .e road this regard, I am unaware of any special law, and none has been brought to my attention, micipal which would permit the exercise of extraterritorial powers in this instance. With respect )orated to general statutory laws, s. 316.006(2), F. S., provides that chartered municipalities shall have original jurisdiction over all streets and highways located within their boundaries, except state roads, and may place and maintain such traffic control devices which conform 'ility of to the manual and specifications of the Department of Transportation upon all ier the streets and highways under their original jurisdiction as they shall deem to the necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of this chapter or to I must regulate, warn, or guide traffic. (Emphasis supplied.) g body U.S. Highway 17 -92 /State Road No. 15 is a state road and excepted from the grant of Lion of jurisdiction made by s. 316.006(2), F. S., and the city is without authority to control or Fective, regulate traffic thereon. Section 316.008, F. S., empowers municipalities, with respect to istered streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the of the police power, to control or regulate certain traffic movement or parking in their on, the respective jurisdictions. As indicated above, state roads are excepted from the original mother finance jurisdiction of the chartered municipalities. Cf. s. 316.008(1)(a), which subjects hitchhiking on state or federal highways lying within the boundaries of a municipality prising to that municipality's control and regulation under its police power. Furthermore, s. 253 080 -101 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 316.640(3)(a),, F. S., grants the police department of each chartered municipality the power to enforce the state's traffic laws only "on all streets and highways thereof and elsewhere throughout the municipality wherever the public has the right to travel by motor vehicle." (Emphasis sup lied.) See AGO 074 -222 in which it was concluded that this section (formerly s. 316.016(3), F. S. 1973) does not empower a municipal police department to enforce the state's traffic laws outside its municipal boundaries. As shown in the above factual statement, the portion of the federal /state highway in question is without the corporate limits of the city. It seems plain to me that the effect of the foregoing statutory provisions is that a municipality may exert police power only over those territories, streets, and highways (except state roads) geographically located within its corporate boundaries. As the highway to which you refer in your letter is outside the legal corporate limits of the City of Orange City, I must conclude that no authority exists which would authorize the municipality to exercise its police powers on this highway. 080 -101— December 23, 1980 MUNICIPAL OCCUPATIONAL LICENSE TAXES APPLICABILITY TO MOBILE HOME MANUFACTURERS OR DEALERS AND MOBILE HOME PARK OPERATORS To: G. R. McClelland, City Attorney, Largo Prepared by: Anne Curtis Terry, Assistant Attorney General QUESTIONS: 1. Does s. 205.193, F. S., preclude the City of Largo from levying and collecting an occupational license tax from mobile home manufacturers and dealers, licensed by the state pursuant to ch. 320, F. S., who have a permanent location or branch offices located within the city? 2. Does s. 205.193 prohibit the city from levying and collecting an occupational license tax from mobile home park operators, licensed by the state as mobile home dealers or manufacturers, who also engage in the business of selling mobile homes? 3. Does s. 205.193 require a mobile home dealer to obtain a separate, city - issued (revenue type) occupational license for his dealer operation at a permanent business location (a mobile home park) within the city? SUMMARY: Until legislatively or judicially clarified or determined otherwise, s. 205.193, F. S., does not preclude the City of Largo from levying and collecting an occupational license tax from mobile home manufacturers and dealers licensed as such by the state pursuant to ch. 320, F. S., who have a permanent location or branch offices located within the city. Nor does s. 205.193 prohibit the city from levying and collecting an additional occupational license tax as a mobile home dealer from a mobile home park operator, licensed by the state as a mobile home dealer or manufacturer, who also engages in the business of selling mobile homes at such mobile home park. Section 205.193 requires a mobile home dealer to obtain a separate city - issued (revenue type) occupational license for his dealer operation at a permanent business location (a mobile home park) within the city. Your inquiry notes confusion as to the proper construction of ch. 79 -120, Laws of Florida, since the statutory reviser codified the law as s. 205.193, F. S., placing it in or transferring it (from ch. 320), to ch. 205, F. S., which deals with local occupational license taxes. You also state your concern over certain changes in the wording of the caption or section heading of s. 320.8286, as created and enacted by ch. 79 -120. Additionally, your 254 quousque quousque (kwoh -as- kwee). [Latin] Hist. As long as; how long; until; how far. • This term was used in conveyances as a limitation. quovis modo (kwoh -vis moh -doh). [Latin] In whatever manner. quo warranto (kwoh wa- ran -toh also kwoh water- an -toh). [Law Latin "by what authori- ty"] 1. A common -law writ used to inquire into the authority by which a public office is held or a franchise is claimed. — Also termed writ of quo warranto. 2. An action by which the state seeks to revoke a corporation's charter. • The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable 1264 to proceedings for quo warranto "to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has therefore conformed to the practice in civil actions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2). "Sometimes the term `quo warranto' is used to describe not only the proceedings under the common -law writ of quo warranto, but also proceedings under an information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto or similar statutory remedies." 74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto § 1(e), at 177 (1951). q.v. abbr. [Latin quod vide] Which see — used in non - Bluebook citations for cross - referencing. Pl. qq.v. R. abbr. 1. rabbinica race act. race -noti that the tice of pi About h utes. — . statute. ( race of i first -sen race state person v has prior olina ha race stat NOTICE S race to t competit assets, u gained b other cre Code, a. intended and inst tors. 2. tween d that litil a lawsui before t: favorabl courthoi ly accu; intellect mal net resolve further races to ment, tI that no See ANT] rachat (. redempt ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 073 -115 so employee is an officer, director, agent, or member of, or owns a :o a controlling interest in any corporation, firm, partnership, or other nv. business entity which is subject to the regulation of, or which has ads substantial business commitments from any state agency, county, city, or , rd; other political subdivision of the state, he shall file a sworn statement hat disclosing such interest with the department of state, if he is a state officer her or employee, or if he is an officer or employee of a county, city, or other political subdivision of the state he shall file the sworn statement with the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which he is principally employed. 073- 115 --April 13, 1973 MUNICIPALITIES EXTENSION OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES TO AREA ANNEXED BY ORDINANCE PENDING JUDICIAL ATTACK ON ;tor VALIDITY OF ANNEXATION ORDINANCE To: Jack Poorbaugh, Representative, 77th District, Tallahassee Prepared by: Rebecca - Bowles Hawkins, Assistant Attorney General QUESTION: Assuming that a municipality has adopted ordinances of annexa- tion pursuant to §171.16, F. S., and that suit has been brought under §171.04, F. S., to contest those annexation ordinances on the ground, among other things, that the property annexed was not contiguous with the city at the time it was proposed to be annexed and that the area so proposed to be annexed does not form a reasonably compact area when added to the municipality, can the municipality extend municipal services, including police, fire, garbage collection, and health and sanitation, to the area proposed to be annexed during the pendency of the suit and prior to any final adjudication? no SUMMARY: our The procedure prescribed by §171.04(1), F. S., for attacking a municipality's annexation of territory containing less than ten registered voters has been invalidated by the Florida Supreme Court and cannot be used to attack the validity of, or to obtain a stay of, annexation proceedings or of an annexation ordinance adopted under the authority of §171.16, id. However, proceedings . in quo warranto or for an injunction and declaratory relief, in a proper case, are available to attack the validity of such ordinance or annexation proceedings. Section 171.16, F. S., (1972 Supp.) [ §1, Ch. 72 -2, Laws of Florida], provides and a supplemental method of annexation of contiguous unincorporated property to and a municipality. This statute (the validity of which has not as yet been tested in I of the courts) authorizes a municipality to adopt an ordinance annexing contiguous ,d unincorporated territory merely upon the petition of the owner or owners of the t as property sought to be annexed, after publication of the proposed ordinance once ite. a week for four consecutive weeks. Section 171.04(1), supra, formerly provided a Of procedure for annexation by a city of contiguous unincorporated territory containing less than ten registered voters and provided that, pending judicial action on objections to such annexation registered by a petition filed in the circuit court, "all further action in the premises by the said city or town shall thereupon be stayed until the further order of the said court." However, this 187 C! If 073 -116 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL portion of §171.04(1), supra, was invalidated by the Florida Supreme Court in Auburndale v. Adams Packing Association, 171 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1965), on the ground that the statute gave the court the power to substitute its will as to the advisability of annexation for that of the municipality's legislative body and was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judiciary. In these :j circumstances, it cannot validly be assumed that objectors to annexations made :; ; pursuant to §171.16, supra, may avail themselves of the procedure prescribed by §171.04(1), supra, and of the "stay" provisions of that section. Thus, unless the court has entered an order temporarily enjoining the furnishing of or extension J of municipal services to the areas described in and annexed by the presumptive- ! ly valid annexation ordinance, the city may extend such services to the annexed :• �. area, despite the pending litigation. I It might be noted, however, that the processes of the court are available to attack the validity of a municipal ordinance in a proper case, and that a x temporary injunction may be issued by the court, enjoining the city from taking j; any action under the authority of the ordinance attacked in such proceedings, pending the final outcome of the case. See Bass v. Addison, 40 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1949), in which the court declined to overturn a temporary injunction issued by the lower court in a suit in equity brought by a taxpayer, challenging the validity ;. of incorporation proceedings taken under the authority of a general law, Ch. 165, F. S.; and Gillette v. City of Tampa, 57 So.2d 27 (Fla. 1952), where the court entertained a suit for declaratory relief and an injunction to determine the validity of and to enjoin annexation proceedings taken under the authority of a special act providing an overall plan for extending the boundaries of the City of Tampa. See also Smith v. Ayres, 174 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1965); and Town of Davie v. Hartline, 199 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1967). The proper method of seeking relief by way of a judgment of ouster where a ! municipality has undertaken unlawfully to exercise jurisdiction or control over land is a quo warranto proceeding. See Caldwell v. Losche, 108 So.2d 295 (2 It , D.C.A. Fla., 1959). However, the jurisdiction of equity may be invoked in a !� proceeding for declaratory relief and an injunction when the attorney general has ij refused to authorize the use of his name in such proceedings and the injured party would be without a remedy at law. Bass v. Addison, supra; Farrington v. j Flood, 40 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1949). See also Town of Davie v. Hartline, supra, in which a suit for declaratory decree was brought to determine that properties were illegally annexed under §171.04, supra. And it may be that, even in a quo 1i warranto proceeding, the court would enter a temporary restraining order under its constitutional "all writs" power, §5 of revised Art. V, State Const., to preserve the status quo pending a determination of the suit on the merits. CJ. Stewart v. '+ Thursby, 137 So. 7 (Fla. 1931); Astca Inv. Co. v. Lake County, 98 So. 824 (Fla. d I 1922); State ex rel. Pettigrew v. Kirk, 243 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1970). 073 - 116 —April 13, 1973 MUNICIPALITIES APPLICABILITY OF REFERENDUM PROVISIONS OF CHARTER ACT OF CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH TO ACTION OF CITY COMMISSION To: John C. Chew, City Attorney, Daytona Beach Prepared by: Rebecca Bowles Hawkins, Assistant Attorney General QUESTIONS: 1. Does a motion duly adopted by the Daytona Beach City J Commission to close the mayor's office in city hall and not to have a ! 188 CALDWELL v. LOSCHE Cite as, Fla.. 108 So.2d 295 wife, Martha Evelyn Hartman, M. T. Hartman, Jr. and wife, Ina T. Hart- man. "§ 74:10 Florida Statutes 1955 pro- vides: "'All cost of proceedings shall be paid by the petitioner, including a rea- sonable attorney's fee for the defend- ant to be assessed by the jury, except the cost upon the writ of error taken by a defendant, on which the judgment of the circuit court shall be affirmed! "The legislative intent in the statute is clear. All cost of the proceedings (which contemplates appellate proceed- ings, since the sole exception is to cost on writ of error under circumstances not present in the case at bar) is re- quired to be paid by the petitioners. It is also clear that reasonable attor- ney's fees are included by the statute as a cost. See De Soto County v. High- smith, Fla., 1952, 60 So.2d 915; cf. Dade County v. Brigham, Fla., 1950, 47 So.2d 602, the principles of which were reaffirmed in the order on rehearing granted in Dade County v. Houk, Fla., 1956, 89 So.2d 649." This order was filed on May 6, 1957. Appellee's petition is hereby granted. Fla. 295 Roy W. CALDWELL, as Mayor of the Town of Tavares, and Town of Tavares, a municipal corporation, Appellants, V . Oscar H. LOSCHE, Appellee. No. 620. District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District. Jan. 21, 1959. Suit for injunction. The Circuit Court for Lake County, T. G. Futch, J., denied motion to dismiss the complaint, and the mayor and the town took an inter- locutory appeal. The District Court of Appeal, Kanner, C. J., held that injunction was not the proper remedy to have the plaintiff's land excluded from municipal limits of the town. Reversed and cause returned for fur- ther proceedings. 1. Municipal Corporations 033(9) Injunction was not the proper remedy to have the plaintiff's land excluded from municipal limits of town of Tavares. Sp. Acts 1943, c. 22493. 2. Quo Warranto 0=5 The proper method seeking relief where a municipality has undertaken to ex- ercise jurisdiction or control over land should be through a quo warranto proceed- ing. It is ordered that attorney's fees are hereby awarded to Bedell and Bedell, as counsel for the Henry G. DuPree Company in this cause, in the amount of $1,500. TERRELL, C. J., and ROBERTS and DREW, JJ•, concur. THORNAL, J., dissents. THORNAL, Justice (dissenting). I dissent on authority of Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Blanshard, 77 Fla. 855, 82 So. 300, 85 Fla. 500, 96 So. 286; Conner v. State Road Department, Fla., 1953, 66 So.2d 257. John P. Wilkerson, Eustis, for appellants. Roy Christopher, Mount Dora, for ap- pellee. KANNER, Chief Judge. The suit is for an injunction; the nature of the appeal is interlocutory, arising from Mir 296 Fla. 108 SOUTHERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES the chancellor's denial of a motion to dis- miss the complaint. [1] The allegations of the complaint are, essentially, that in 1952 appellee bought a certain lot or parcel of land and began developing it in 1956, having been informed by all parties, including his predecessor in title, that it was without the municipal boundaries of the Town of Tavares and so considered by the town; that although the town had not previously attempted to as- sert jurisdiction over appellee's property or that of his predecessors in title, the town clerk, by letter to appellee in 1957, stated that the property was within the municipal limits and therefore subject to all municipal zoning and other regulations and ordi- nances; that in 1958 appellee was sum- moned to appear in municipal court for zoning violations; that the town, to assert its jurisdiction, relied on chapter 22493, Special Laws of Florida, 1943, which de- fined the town boundaries; and that, four- teen years having elapsed between passage of the act and the town's assertion of its jurisdiction over the land, the town was therefore guilty of ]aches. Further, there is only the bare allegation that the town has not "given any municipal benefits to said land." The permanent relief prayed for is that the town and its mayor be enjoined from interfering or further prosecuting appellee for violation of the building and zoning codes, and that appellee's property be de- clared to be without and ousted from the jurisdiction of the municipality of Tavares. In addition to the prayer of the complaint, appellee in his brief, p. 1, after stating the substance of his complaint, says, "Whereupon Appellee sued for injunction against Town, Appellant, seeking ouster from municipal jurisdiction and proper establishment of Town boundary line." Again he says on p. 7, "Appellants contend that complaint is one to enjoin a criminal prosecution and enjoin taxation but Ap- pellee most respectfully urges complaint is one questioning municipal jurisdiction over Appellee's lands." Thus the theory and purpose of the case, as well as the relief sought by the appellee, is to have his land excluded from the municipal limits of the Town of Tavares. [2] The rule is generally recognized and has long been established in Florida juris- prudence that the proper method of seek- ing relief where a municipality has under- taken to exercise jurisdiction or control over land should be through a quo war - ranto proceeding. City of South Miami v. State, 1939, 140 Fla. 740, 192 So. 624; State ex rel. Harrington v. City of Pom- pano, 1938, 136 Fla. 730, 188 So. 610, 615; and 74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto § 4, p. 181, and § 13, p. 196. This is not a case where it is sought to restrain the municipality from collecting taxes on land because the lands are so re- mote, unbenefited from any municipal serv- ice, or without prospect of municipal bene- fits as to come within the scope of the case of City of Sarasota v. Skillen, 1937, 130 Fla. 724, 178 So. 837, and like cases. The purpose of the appellee is to have his parcel of land ousted from the municipal boundaries of the Town of Tavares so that the town cannot assert any jurisdic- tion over it. However, the result accom- plished by an injunction decree restraining taxation of lands by a municipality does not alter the boundary lines of the munici- pality but prevents taxation of the lands while they receive no actual or potential benefit by being included within the bound- ary limits of the municipality. Riviera Club v. City of Ormond, 1941, 147 Fla. 401, 2 So.2d 721. In the City of Ormond case it may be noted that the Riviera Club obtained a state and county license to se.11 liquors within the statutory limits of the City of Ormond, but did not obtain a city license because it claimed the area upon which the liquors were to be sold was unlawfully incorporated in the city. The proceeding was that of injunction to enjoin the city from selling 's Y HOOKER v. HOWELL BROWN FARMS Fla. 2J7 Cite as, Fla., 108 So.2d 297 ,ory and he relief his land :s of the sized and da juris- of seek - .s under- control duo war - Miami v. So. 624; of Pom- 510, 615 181, and ,ought to :ollecting re so re- pal serv- al bene- of the en, 1937, cases. to have municipal vares so jurisdic- t accom- straining lity does munici- he lands potential e bound - Riviera Fla. 401, may be :d a state •ithin the fond, but :cause it liquors orporated that of n selling a stock of liquor levied upon under a dis- tress warrant issued by the city. The Supreme Court ruled in that case that the alleged invalidity of the corporate bound- aries can be judicially determined only by a proceeding in quo warranto. The complaint lays no basis for injunc- tive relief. The chancellor should have granted the motion to dismiss. The inter- locutory order is hereby reversed and the cause is returned for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Reversed. Capital Lincoln- Mercury, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., Fla.App.1958, 105 So.2d 899. CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., and PEAR - SON, J., and WIGGINTON, JOHN T., Associate Judge, concur. w 0 5 KEY NUMBER SYSTEM T Moses Junior HOOKER, Petitioner, ALLEN, J., and KNOTT, JAMES R., V. A. J., concur. HOWELL BROWN FARMS, North America Companies, carrier, and Florida Indus- trial Commission, Respondents. w No. 763. Q S NET NUMBER SYSTEM T Vernon L. MAPLES, Appellant, V . ROCK FINANCE COMPANY, a Wisconsin corporation, Appellee. No. 58 -504. District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District. Jan. 22, 1959. Appeal from the Civil Court of Record for Dade County; David J. Heffernan, Judge. John T. Bond and Austin O. Bonidy, Miami, for appellant. Robert King High Law Offices, Miami, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Commercial Credit Cor- poration v. Schneider, 265 Wis. 264, 61 N. W.2d 499; Vincent v. General Motors Ac- ceptance Corp., F1a.1954, 75 So.2d 778; 108 So.2d -19% District Court of Appeal of Florida. , Second District. Jan. 9, 1959. Rehearing Denied Feb. 6, 1959. Proceeding on petition for writ of cer- tiorari to Florida Industrial Commission. The District Court of Appeal, Kanner, C. J., held that where claimant suffering injury arising out of and in course of his employment was at time of his injury cul- tivating land for a weekly wage of $36 and had been doing so for about four weeks, but in the normal course of events would have changed from cultivation to truck driving with claimant and his employer then entering upon a share cropping ar- rangement, there was no error in comput- ing his average weekly wage at $36 under statutory provision that if methods speci- fied could not reasonably and fairly be ap- plied, full time weekly wage of injured employee should be used. Petition for writ denied. Workmen's Compensation 0=820 Where claimant, injured while in the course of his employment, had been earn- h irts the on nal up- .re- er- of im- in ca- th- ant of 'he la- in `he ri- fer 'w he .te rt ri- le to y .1 ORANGE COUNTY v. CITY OF ORLANDO Fla. 7 Cite as, Fla., 327 So.2d 7 language. Accordingly, it is ordered by McDonald, J., denied motion to dismiss as- I' the Court: pect of complaint as to injunctive and de- 1. The Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases submitted to this Court on December 15, 1975 are authorized to be published and distributed to the judiciary and members of the Bar of this state in accordance with the copy that is attached. 2. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.985, Standard Jury Instructions, shall ap- ply to these amended instructions. 3. The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases is continued as a committee of this Court for the immediate purpose of re- viewing errors and inaccuracies and rec- ommending to this Court amendments and revisions as experience may prove benefi- cial. 4. The members of the Bench and Bar who shall constitute the continuing com- mittee shall be reappointed or appointed by the Chief Justice and serve at his pleasure without compensation. It is so ordered. ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD, OVERTON, ENGLAND, SUND- BERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. D O Y NUMBER SYSTEM ORANGE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Petitioner, V. CITY OF ORLANDO, a Municipal Corpora- tion, organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Respondent. No. 47192. Supreme Court of Florida. Jan. 28, 1976. County brought action against city for injunctive and declaratory relief from an- nexation ordinances of the city. The Cir- cuit Court, Orange County, Parker Lee claratory relief, and the city appealed, The District Court of Appeal, Fla.App., 309 So.2d 16, reversed and remanded, and writ of certiorari was granted. The Su- preme Court, Overton, J., held that the Su- preme Court had jurisdiction to harmonize conflicting prior decisions of the Supreme Court and the district courts of appeal, that equitable relief was improper since pe- titioner had an adequate remedy at law available in a quo warranto inquiry into the legality of the municipal actions, and that an action for injunctive and declarato- ry relief would only be proper in the event that the Attorney General refused to allow quo warranto to proceed. Ordered accordingly. I. Courts 0=216 The Supreme Court had jurisdiction to harmonize prior conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court and the district courts of appeal. West's F.S.A.Const. art. 5, § 3(b) (3). 2. Declaratory Judgment 0209 Quo Warranto 0-5 In action by county against city for in- junctive and declaratory relief from city annexation ordinances, equitable relief was improper since the county had an adequate remedy at law available in a quo warranto inquiry into the legality of such municipal action; but the action for injunctive and declaratory relief would be proper if the Attorney General refused to allow quo warranto to proceed. Steven R. Bechtel of Mateer, Harbert, Bechtel & Phalin, Orlando, for petitioner. James A. Fowler, Asst. City Atty., for respondent. OVERTON, Justice. [1] This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the deci- $ Fla. 327 SOUTHERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES sion of the Fourth District Court of Ap- peal reported at 309 So.2d 16 (Fla-App. 4th 1975). The decision appears to conflict with Smith v. Ayres, 174 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1965), and does conflict with Town of Mangonia Park v. Homan, 118 So.2d 585 (Fla.App.2d 1960), although it is in accord- ance with Caldwell v. Losche, 108 So.2d 295 (Fla.App.2d 1959). We have jurisdic- tion to harmonize these decisions. [2] Petitioner Orange County com- menced this action against respondent City of Orlando for injunctive and declaratory relief from annexation ordinances of the City of Orlando. The District Court held that equitable relief was improper since pe- titioner had an adequate remedy at law available in a quo warranto inquiry into the legality of such municipal action, citing Caldwell v. Losche, supra. The opinion distinguished Smith v. Ayres, supra, and Town of Mangonia Park v. Homan, supra, on the grounds that the quo warranto issue was not raised in either of those cases. While the District Court so distinguished Town of Mangonia Park v. Homan, supra, the court in that case did consider the ap- propriateness of a quo warranto proceed- ing and declined to dismiss the equitable action upon that ground. Direct conflict is therefore apparent. We agree with the opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in the instant case for the reasons expressed therein, and affirm. Petitioner has an adequate remedy at law in quo warranto. In the event quo warranto is not available, i. e., the Attorney General refuses to allow quo warranto to proceed, then an action for injunctive and declaratory relief would be proper. The conflict previously appearing in opinions of the District Court Donald D. BAKER, Petitioner, V. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary, Depart- ment of Offender Rehabilitation, State of Florida, Respondent. No. 48409. Supreme Court of Florida. Jan. 28, 1976. Petitioner filed petition for writ of ha- beas corpus seeking credit for time served in county jail prior to sentencing, and the writ was issued and a return was required. The Supreme Court, Roberts, J., held that petitioner was entitled to credit for the time spent in county jail prior to sentenc- ing. Ordered accordingly. Criminal Law c�=1216(1) Petitioner was entitled to credit for the time spent in county jail prior to sen- tencing. West's F.S.A. §§ 921.161, 921.- 161(1). Donald D. Baker, in pro per. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Wal- lace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for re- spondent. ROBERTS, Justice. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of ha- beas corpus seeking credit for time served in county jail prior to sentencing. This Court issued the writ and required a re- turn. s and this The respondent, through the Attorney Court having been dispelled, the writ here- General, has promptly responded to the tofore issued is discharged. It is so ordered. ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD and ENGLAND JJ., concur. writ of habeas corpus and states that peti- tioner's claim that he should have been given credit for time served in county jail prior to sentencing has merit. Section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent Art. V, § 3(b) (3), F1a.Const. CITY COUNCIL OF EDGEWATER JOINT WORKSHOP SESSION BETWEEN EDGEWATER AND OAK HILL SEPTEMBER 27, 1999 5:30 P.M. COMMUNITY CENTER MINUTES CALL TO ORDER Mayor Randy Allman called the Workshop to order at 5:30 p.m. in the Community Center. ROLL CALL Mayor Randy Allman Present Councilman James Gornto Excused Councilman Myron Hammond Present Councilman Gary Roberts Present Councilwoman Judith Lichter Present City Attorney Nikki Clayton Present City Manager Kenneth Hooper Present City Clerk Susan Wadsworth Present Police Chief Lawrence Schumaker Present Mayor Bennett Present Commissioner Wood Absent Commissioner Travis Present Commissioner Vann Present Vice Mayor Bracy Absent City Attorney Gayle Graziano Present City Clerk Kim Cherbano Present INVOCATION, PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE There was a silent invocation and pledge of allegiance to the Flag. DISCUSSION REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT PLANNING AREA AND ANNEXATION BOUNDARIES THROUGH AN INTERLOCAL AGREEMENT City Manager Hooper made a staff presentation and went over an aerial map. He pointed out the wastewater facility. City Manager Hooper explained that the two cities are interested in trying to come to an agreement to draw some kind of line for annexation purposes. Councilman Roberts feels it would make sense that way you could plan your infrastructure. Mayor Bennett stated that the interlocal agreement needs to include the County. She feels Edgewater could provide service to Oak Hill. City Manager Hooper stated the City of Edgewater has capacity to do sewer and water but the difficulty is in the transmission of the collection lines. DISCUSSION OF UTILITY SERVICE AREAS SERVICE PROVIDERS AND AVAILABILITY OF WATER AND WASTEWATER SERVICES Commissioner Vann stated it is his understanding that the County is now going to service up to Hacienda Del Rio with the proposed plant that they are going to build in Oak Hill. City Manager Hooper explained the County is going to build their plant and purchase water from the City of Edgewater and the City of Edgewater is going to buy sewer service from the County. Commissioner Vann stated with the agreement the City of Edgewater just signed with the County, the county is going to be the middle man regardless of what Edgewater does. City Manager Hooper stated this Council has identified the sewer capacity we have as being allocated for the City today and any annexations in the future. Commissioner Vann asked if that is also true for water. City Manager Hooper stated that is not true for water. With water, whatever the City of Oak Hill needed he thinks the City of Edgewater would supply, whether it be directly to them or through the County. Mayor Bennett asked if the agreement on the water is the unincorporated County. City Manager Hooper informed her yes. If the County wanted to buy some and serve Oak Hill they would have to get their approval. Mayor Bennett asked if they can buy directly from the City. City Manager Hooper stated they would have a choice of buying wholesale capacity from the county or from the City of Edgewater. Our agreement with them is just to serve the unincorporated area. Councilwoman Lichter asked if Terra Mar is listed as Oak Hill or Edgewater with the Postal Service. City Manager Hooper explained that is just a postal address and has nothing to do with actual city limits. Councilwoman Lichter asked about Riverbreeze Park. City Manager Hooper asked if Oak Hill has talked to the County regarding water and sewer. Mayor Bennett stated they were talking about the interlocal agreement to come up with some type of boundary so future plans could be made. CviuluijSlVller Vann stated the have two y years left on a five -year moratorium before they can have water and sewer services provided to them. There was some discussion regarding coming up with an imaginary line. Page -2- Council Workshop /Oak Hill September 27, 1999 Councilman Roberts expressed concern about the U.S. #1 corridor. He mentioned how far you would carry this imaginary line out west. He questioned what roads are out there west of U.S. #1. City Manager Hooper stated later on the agenda they are going to talk about evacuation route. There are two choices either SR 442 or Maytown Road. When you look at those two choices and you continue further to the west, whichever of those is ever paved widened and put in place can have a lot to do with which City goes to the west and how fast. Councilman Roberts asked about the Metropolitan Planning Organization moving to have SR 442 connected with SR 415. City Manager Hooper explained to Oak Hill the City of Edgewater has requested the MPO add SR 442 west to SR 415 as a road on the twenty -year plan to make that an evacuation route. Councilwoman Lichter questioned a couple of the roads north of Oak Hill going west to I -95. She was informed Maytown Road is the only one. Commissioner Vann explained Maytown is a County road. He went on explain what is being done to pave Maytown Road. Councilwoman Lichter asked if they come to some kind of tentative conclusion with a boundary, it would be up to the people in that area if they want to stay in the County or be annexed in. Councilwoman Lichter spoke about as they take in annexations and the County shrinks, the County doesn't shrink in its budget like it should. Commissioner Vann explained they have tentatively proposed to annex U.S. #1 up to Williams Road, below East Aerial Road and Terra Mar Village. Councilwoman Lichter feels the dividing line should be Clinton Cemetery Road and Jones Fish Camp Road. City Manager Hooper spoke about laws changing to annex roads. City Attorney Clayton spoke about voluntary and involuntary annexations. Councilwoman Lichter asked if it is customary for legislative bodies to literally conceptually divide by a line or do you sometimes have input from the people that live in those areas. Page -3- Council Workshop /Oak Hill September 27, 1999 City Attorney Clayton spoke about the agreement Edgewater has with New Smyrna Beach. He feels the line would be a lot softer because there will be choices from some who prefer to be in Oak Hill and others who would prefer to have urban services that are there today from the City of Edgewater. City Manager Hooper explained usually you come up with a plan and have public hearings on that plan. The two jurisdictions start talking about it and draw it up and then you hold public hearings. In this case, there is a third party, the County. We are talking of dividing their land so they become part of an agreement as to what we are trying to do too. Councilman Roberts spoke about long range planning. He feels people would be a little more at ease if they new where they will end up in the future and the services they will receive. Mayor Bennett feels Clinton Cemetery Road and Jones Fish Camp Road should be where the line should be. Oak Hill cannot go south and they are having problems going west because of the sewer plant being there. They get in to the point of being blocked in. They really wanted to get with Edgewater and come up with some type of interlocal agreement. Councilman Roberts spoke about Edgewater's plans being to annex to the west. He doesn't see where Edgewater would want to expand too far to the south. He feels they should let Oak Hill mature and come forward to meet us. We have so much more potential to the west of our community. Let Oak Hill incorporate Terra Mar in the future and come up to Clinton Cemetery Road and Jones Fish Camp Road. Councilwoman Lichter feels it seems logical to her to draw the line at Clinton Cemetery Road and Jones Fish Camp Road. Councilwoman Lichter asked about the Comprehensive Plan. Planning Director Lynne Plaskett commented on the land uses between Edgewater and Oak Hill. Councilman Roberts feels there may not be many differences in zoning from the County zoning to the City zoning. He doesn't see this as an obstacle. City Manager Hooper explained some of that works by defining your own needs. Edgewater would color a map to what portion we want and Oak Hill would do the same and then present it to the County. The State really wants counties and cities to adopt coordinating land uses so when they do annex they can come in and have consistent land uses and zoning and you don't have to go through a Comp Plan amendment. Page -4- Council Workshop /Oak Hill September 27, 1999 Ms. Plaskett showed a map of the land uses in the County. City Manager Hooper stated the only issue he has with this is when they decide they want to go to Jones Fish Camp Road, they are probably going to need to come up with what urban services will be provided. Councilman Hammond went to the map to show the line going west. Councilman Roberts stated you would have to work this around ownership of properties. City Manager Hooper feels the further west you go, the more you are going to have the County as a player. Commissioner Vann asked Ms. Plaskett to get with Dennis Fischer to come up with a preliminary map for all of them to agree on. City Manager Hooper agreed to do so. City Manager Hooper stated they are going to make an effort to define the line and get with the County to come in and discuss this. Commissioner Vann spoke about six or eight homes on Clinton Cemetery Road that need to be taken into consideration. City Manager Hooper asked if there are any other services they need to talk about. DISCUSSION REGARDING NEED FOR ADDITIONAL EVACUATION ROUTE SERVING SOUTHEAST VOLUSIA There was some discussion regarding evacuation routes and the County. There was a brief discussion regarding Miami Corporation owning property between Oak Hill and Edgewater and conflict they are having with the County. City Manager Hooper stated the Miami Corporation approached our Mayor and offered gladly to make it happen so that is how we got into discussions with them to make this road continue west. Councilman Roberts feels both cities need their own evacuation route. We are spread too far to try and come up with a central evacuation route. We are going to have to push DOT to get SR 442 west and Oak Hill is going to have to push the County to get Maytown Road as their main east -west access. Councilwoman Lichter feels we should have a couple of evacuation routes. City Manager Hooper feels both cities need to push the MPO. He feels somehow there could be a joint resolution. He feels the County and State would be willing to look at this. Page -5- Council Workshop /Oak Hill September 27, 1999 Mayor Bennett feels this is the time to move on this. She spoke of doing this venture together. City Manager Hooper stated the resolution part is simple. They would say we are willing to look at SR 442 or Maytown Road or combination as a way out. MPO would need to fund some studies. They are aiming for October. Regular Meetings in October will be held October 4 th and 18 tH . ITEMS FOR FUTURE DISCUSSION Tom Alcorn stated the Chamber would also like to be involved with representing Southeast Volusia. They are very much in favor of a westward exit in case of an emergency. There was a discussion regarding what to include in the letter to be sent to the County Council. Ed Keenan, 1905 Pine Tree Drive, spoke about the evacuation route. He feels we would have a better chance getting Maytown Road to be the evacuation route for two cities. He feels this would also be closer to the Greenway that is coming on the southern end. With Miami Land offering 200 feet of right -of -way there is a possibility both cities could benefit from this. Commissioner Vann spoke about a road off of Maytown Road that runs north and south and would be the perfect artery to tie in Maytown Road and the proposed road that will come up to SR 442. Mayor Bennett thanked the City Council for meeting with them. She feels really good because she feels they will be able to offer support of each other in the future. Mayor Allman feels they need to meet this twice a year. It is an excellent opportunity for them to clear the air. He suggested meeting during January and June. City Manager Hooper stated the resolution will be ready for the October 18 meeting. ADJOURNMENT There being no further business to discuss, the workshop was adjourned at 6:37 p.m. Minutes submitted by Lisa Bloomer Page -6- Council Workshop /Oak Hill September 27, 1999